78. It is evident from the facts of the case that the President, on the one hand, admitted a time-barred clarification. On the other hand, being that the current regulations at that time provided that only the judge that rendered the judgment could clarify or amplify, the President, himself, decided to clarify the judgment, when this corresponded to the plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal, and therefore his decision was not in accordance with the applicable law (supra para. 71). This Court considers that the President of the Constitutional Tribunal acted outside the scope of his jurisdiction, to which due process was not guaranteed upon application of procedures that were not legally established. 71 79. Moreover, this Court notes that as a result of that decision of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal, a situation of legal uncertainty and doubt arose regarding the implementation of the ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of March 12, 2002. This due to the fact that Mr. Mejía Idrovo demanded compliance with the decision of the Plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal, while the defendant, the President of the Republic, argued that he would satisfy that decided by the President of the Constitutional Tribunal. 3) failure to transfer the motion for clarification and legal notice to one of the parties subsequent to the resolution 80. The Commission and the representatives argued that Mr. Mejía Idrovo was informed, without being officially provided with legal notice of the motion for a clarification by the General Command of the Land Forces and of the subsequent decision of the President of the Constitutional Tribunal of May 30, 2002. The State did not dispute this allegation. In regard to the motion for clarification, Article 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly states that “for clarification or expansion, the remaining party must be heard.” 81. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court has found that the representatives and the Commission, in their briefs, refer either to the lack of legal notice regarding the motion for clarification and the resolution of the President, stating the applicable law, without indicating the date that the alleged victim learned, unofficially, of such action and without identifying and determining the evidence in support of their arguments. Accordingly, this Court does not have enough elements to consider and determine whether Mr. Mejía Idrovo had the procedural opportunity to exercise his right to a defense. 82. In light of that mentioned in this section, the Court concludes that the State carried out a procedure that was beyond its jurisdiction upon admitting a time-barred request for clarification, and for clarifying a judgment issued by the Plenary of the Constitutional Tribunal. 71 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et to V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 30, 1999. Series C No. 52, para. 129; Case of Ivcher Bronstein V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 6, 2001. Series C No. 74, para. 112, and Case of the Constitutional Tribunal V. Perú. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, para. 73. See also Principle 5 of the Basic Principles of the United Nations on the Independence of the Judiciary. Adopted by the Seventh Congress of the United Nations on Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders held in Milan from August 26 to September 6, 1985, and confirmed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 of and 40/146 of December 13, 1985. 26