remedies, given that their purpose is suitable to “protect the infringed legal situation” and they would be “able to produce the result for which they were established to produce.” 25. The representatives argued that the sole purpose for the civil action for damages is to “establish the economic values in favor of the petitioner,” without allowing, “by way of said judicial remedy, for a judge to order measures of reparation of a non-patrimonial nature such as the reinstatement of the petitioner in the armed forces, public apologies to the [alleged] victim or his family, and guarantees of non-repetition, among others, for which said remedy is not appropriate to fully repair the [alleged] victim.” As such, the representatives requested “that the second preliminary objection also be dismissed and for the Court to continue on to an analysis of the merits of the case.” 26. The Commission considered that “the requirement of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies does not mean that the alleged victims have the obligation to exhaust all of the remedies available to them.” Moreover, it noted that the “civil action for damages was not the most appropriate remedy to achieve that which was established by the Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal.” In this sense, the information provided to the Commission notes that the Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal, “according to said Court, was self-executable; therefore the Executive Branch and the Armed Forces were obligated to comply” with the Resolution of March 12, 2002. As such, the Commission considered “the objection filed by the State of Ecuador to be unfounded and inadmissible, reason for which it requested the Court to dismiss it.” Considerations of the Court 27. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention provides that in order to determine admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 of the Convention, it is necessary that the domestic remedies be pursued and exhausted in accordance with the generally recognized principles of international law.12 The Court recalls that the principle of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is designed for the benefit of the State, given that it attempts to excuse the State from going before an international body for acts attributed to it, before having had the opportunity to remedy them using its own means.13 28. The foregoing means that these remedies must not only exist formally, but rather that they must also be appropriate and effective, as shown by the exceptions enshrined in Article 46(2) of the Convention.14 12 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez V. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of Julne 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 85; Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores V. México, supra note 5, para. 19; and Case of Vera Vera et al. V. Ecuador. Preliminar Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 19, 2011. Series C No. 224, para. 13. 13 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra note 6, para. 61, and Case of Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales. Judgment of March 15, 1989, Series C No. 6, para 85. 14 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez V. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, supra note 12, para. 63; Case of Vélez Loor V. Panamá. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010. Series C No. 218, para. 19, and Case of Vera Vera et al. V. Ecuador, supra note 12, para. 13. 9