100. The guarantee of judicial control set out in Article 7(5) of the Convention establishes that in order to be an effective safeguard against unlawful or arbitrary detentions, they must be carried out “without delay.”117 The same provision also establishes that a detainee must be “judged with a reasonable time” or “released” even though the proceedings may continue. The rationale of this norm is that measures depriving liberty during criminal proceedings are treaty-based, provided that they have a precautionary purpose; that is, that they are a means to offset procedural risks, especially the norm that applies to a person who does not appear in order to be tried.118 101. In addition to the foregoing, Article 7(6) of the Convention protects the right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty to appeal the lawfulness of the detention before a competent court or judge so that the lawfulness may be decided without delay and, if applicable, to have his or her release ordered.119 The Court has specified that the available remedies available to comply with this guarantee “must not only exist formally in the legislation but they must also be effective; that is, they comply with the objective of obtaining a decision without delay on the legality of the arrest or the detention.”120 102. In some aspects, the judicial guarantees established in Article 8 of the Convention may be seen as strictly related to the right of personal liberty. Thus, it is relevant for the effects of the case to point out that since preventive detention is a precautionary, and not a punitive, measure121 its application is limited by the principle of the presumption of innocence found in Article 8(2) of the Convention, according to which a person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Therefore, the appropriateness or the legitimacy of the preventive deprivation of liberty cannot be presumed but must be grounded on the objective and clear circumstances of the specific case that apply to the person being criminally prosecuted, and cannot only be grounded on the personal characteristics of the alleged perpetrator nor the gravity of the crime of which he has been charged. 122 The preventive deprivation of liberty must observe the above-mentioned purposes and precautions (supra paras. 98 to 100). To maintain a person deprived of his liberty beyond a reasonable time to comply with the valid purposes that the measure might pursue would be the equivalent of a punishment in advance,123 “which would not only be contrary to the right of personal liberty, but also contrary to the presumption of innocence established in Article 8(2) of the Convention.”124 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 81 and Case of Guerrero, Molina et al. v. Venezuela, para. 105. 117 Cf. Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 15, 2019. Series C No. 391, para. 100 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 64. 118 Cf. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (arts. 27(2), 25.1 y 7.6 American Convention oh Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987, para. 33 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 110. 119 Cf. Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C No.129, para. 97 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 110. 120 Cf. Case of Pollo Rivera et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 21, 2016. Series C No. 319, para. 122 and Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 89. 121 Cf. Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 357 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 67. See also, Case of Villarroel Merino et al. v. Ecuador, para. 93. 122 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77 and Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 67. 123 124 Cf. Case of Carranza Alarcón v. Ecuador, para. 67. 28