49). The State, in its arguments, also mentioned, as a normative basis for the detentions, Article 46 of the Law of Amparo (supra para. 89). 107. In accordance with the aforementioned domestic normative (supra paras. 29 to 31) and as explained by the expert Vásquez González,129 at the time of the events of the present case the Venezuelan legal order contemplated the possibility of the detention of a person under the following conditions: a) en flagrante crime; b) order of the competent authority, and c) by the police for reasons of “necessity and urgency.” 108. Therefore, the assertion of the Commission and the representatives that the applicable domestic legal order exclusively required a judicial order or a crime en flagrante to proceed to the deprivation of liberty is not exact (supra para. 85).130 On the other hand, neither the facts of the case nor the arguments of the parties and the Commission show that either of those two reasons were relevant in the circumstances examined. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the third cause, which refers to police action for reasons of necessity and urgency, which was argued by the State as a legal basis for the detentions. 109. As the expert Vásquez González explained, Article 60 of the Constitution in force at the time of the events permitted the police authorities, in the case of the commission of a punishable act, to adopt the “necessary and urgent provisional” measures that are “indispensable” to “ensure the investigation of the facts and the prosecution of the guilty.” The expert stated that “the breadth of the constitutional provision […] enables the detention by the police,” and that it was made “explicit” in the Law of Amparo.131 110. In effect, Article 45 of that Constitution did state what was expressed (supra para. 30). A literal reading of its text shows that the “detention of the presumed guilty person” was a possibility for the police who operated in cases of “necessity and urgency.” Therefore, the detention ordered and implemented directly by the police must be “substantiated and be in writing.” 111. The police who were involved in the detentions of Belkis González, María Angélica González, Fernando González, Wilmer Antonio Barliza González, Luis Guillermo González and Olimpiades Gonzales reported that the detentions were based on Article 45. The facts show that the police took into account the existence of a punishable act and that they asserted that they had the evidence to consider the possible relation of the six persons with the act. However, it is not shown from the actions of the police that they substantiated that they were presented with a situation of necessity or urgency that would necessitate the detentions.132 129 Cf. Written statement of the expert Magaly Mercedes Vásquez González. The Commission maintained that the Inter-American Court in the Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela case had stated that “according to the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Prosecution in order that a detention be legal […] a judicial order is necessary unless the person was apprehended en flagrante” (supra footnote on page 93). However, in the Court’s Judgment in that case, there is no such holding (cf. Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C No. 206). 130 131 Cf. Written statement of the expert Magaly Mercedes Vásquez González. Note should be taken that this was not clear from the facts, nor was it argued by the State. As to the detentions of Wilmer Antonio Barliza González, Luis Guillermo González González and Olimpiades González, although they occurred after the police became aware of the gunfight, it does not show from the actions of the police that the detentions were due to that circumstance, but rather because of the presumed relation of those persons to a criminal act and because of the discovery of firearms. On the other hand, the authorities, as a basis for the detention of the five detentions, referred to Article 74 of the former Procedural Code. The 132 30