contentious case that has already been ruled on; furthermore, they must all be exclusively addressing compliance with the respective judgment by the State concerned. III.- Lack of authority. In short, the treaty rules, statutes and regulations do not explicitly include provisional measures among the proceedings that follow the relevant judgment. There is no rule that allows the Court to proceed with provisional measures after it has ruled on the contentious case in question. Thus it would not be possible to apply to the institution of provisional measures "the theory of inherent powers" since they, by their very nature, were conceived as powers that an international organization requires to comply with the roles not provided for, however, in its base Convention or constituent Treaty36 and thus such powers must be understood to be granted. In contrast, these powers are expressly awarded the Court, and are therefore are "explicit," they are found in Article 63(2) of the Convention and this rule must be adhered to, which is the rule that should be applied or, if appropriate, interpreted. Therefore, it is not possible that the "theory of implicit powers" principle be applied with regard to such measures, as, in contrast, occurred with the provisions in the report submitted by the Court to the OAS General Assembly, where, based on the provisions of the Convention,37 and in the Statute of the Court,38 the monitoring of compliance with judgments39 was established in the Rules of Procedure and thus a procedural institution.40 Nor would it be appropriate to invoke the principle pro homine, at least in the way it is enshrined in the Convention,41 to justify the adoption of provisional measures after the issuance of the judgment on merits, since, although this principle refers to "rights" of the persons recognized therein, such measures are conceived as a power of the Court42 and, 36 Cour Internationale de Justice. Réparation des dommages subis au service des Nations Unies. Avis Consultatif du 11 avril 1949: “[d]e l'avis de la Cour, l'[O] rganisation était destinée à exercer des fonctions et à jouir de droits - et elle l'a fait - qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que si l'Organisation possède une large mesure de personnalité internationale et la capacité d'agir sur le plan international. Elle est actuellement le type le plus élevé d'organisation internationale, et elle ne pourrait répondre aux intentions de ses fondateurs si elle était dépourvue de la personnalité internationale. On doit admettre que ses Membres, en lui assignant certaines fonctions, avec les devoirs et les responsabilités qui les accompagnent, l'ont revêtue de la compétence nécessaire pour lui permettre de s'acquitter effectivement de ces fonctions.” 37 Arts. 65 and 68 of the Convention. 38 Art. 30 of the Statute of the Court 39 Art. 60 of the Convention. 40 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 100: "[T]he legal grounds for the authority of the Inter-American Court to supervise compliance with its decisions is to be found in Articles " 33, 62(1), 62(3) and 65 of the Convention. 41 Art. 29 of the Convention. 42 Cf. Matter of certain Venezuelan Prisons. Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela. Order of the Court of July 6, 2011, Considering Clause 4. " Article 63(2) of the Convention requires that for the Court to order provisional measures three conditions must be present: i) 'extreme gravity' ii)' urgency ', and iii) the intention to' avoid irreparable damage to person.' These three conditions are coexistent and must be present in any situation where the intervention of the Court is requested. Similarly, the three conditions must persist for the 8