the Statute of the Court,38 the monitoring of compliance with judgments39 was established in the Rules of Procedure and thus a procedural institution.40 Nor would it be appropriate to invoke the principle pro homine, at least in the way it is enshrined in the Convention,41 to justify the adoption of provisional measures after the issuance of the judgment on merits, since, although this principle refers to "rights" of the persons recognized therein, such measures are conceived as a power of the Court42 and, furthermore, it should keep in mind that if an application included that principle with regard to the latter, it would be referring to the fact that the rule that regulates them should be interpreted in view of its object and purpose, which is to avoid the irreparable damage that a person involved in a contentious case could suffer, during the proceeding before the Court. Finally, it is not admissible to allude to the practice of the Court regarding the repeated declarations of provisional measures after pronouncing the judgment on merits in the respective contentious case to argue that, thereby, the act is legitimate, specifically because it was accepted by States who did not protest against it and effectively complied with the provisions of such measures. And such a reference would not be worthy of consideration because the attitude of the State concerned would not be an unequivocal demonstration of their will or intention to accept or agree that the aforementioned practice is a new rule that arises in the absence of treaty addressing the matter and, consequently, it imposes a new obligation upon them, but rather it moreover would be an expression that, on the subject, it says nothing and, simply, having previously and conventionally committed to it, complies with a court order. Therefore, such compliance does not create a new obligation for the State, but rather the State responds to the provisions of a conventional rule. The estoppel rule or the doctrine of one's own acts or the preclusion would not be admissible regarding the State Party to proceedings, since with its indicated act, it had no intention of creating, through the relevant proceeding provided for in the Convention, a new international legal rule or a new international legal obligation. 38 39 Art. 30 of the Statute of the Court Art. 60 of the Convention. 40 Cf. Case of Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama. Competence. Judgment of November 28, 2003. Series C No. 104, para. 100: "[T]he legal grounds for the authority of the Inter-American Court to supervise compliance with its decisions is to be found in Articles " 33, 62(1), 62(3) and 65 of the Convention. 41 Art. 29 of the Convention. 42 Cf. Matter of certain Venezuelan Prisons. Provisional Measures regarding Venezuela. Order of the Court of July 6, 2011, Considering Clause 4. " Article 63(2) of the Convention requires that for the Court to order provisional measures three conditions must be present: i) 'extreme gravity' ii)' urgency ', and iii) the intention to' avoid irreparable damage to person.' These three conditions are coexistent and must be present in any situation where the intervention of the Court is requested. Similarly, the three conditions must persist for the Court to maintain the protection so ordered. If a condition ceases to be effective, the Court shall assess the need to continue the protection so ordered." 9