column, expressing the author's critical position regarding the events that occurred on September 30, 2010. 115. In relation to the foregoing, the Court recalls that, in the context of the debate on issues of public interest, the right to freedom of expression not only protects the broadcast of statements that are harmless or well received by public opinion, but also the of those that shock, irritate or disturb public officials or any sector of the population. 176. In this regard, the Court notes that article 19(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights establishes that "Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference." In this way, although Mr. Palacio Urrutia’s statements were extremely critical of the actions of the then President regarding the events of September 30, 2010, and the possibility of granting a pardon to those involved, this does not imply that his speech is without protection from the perspective of freedom of expression. On the contrary, under the standards that this Court has established, an opinion article that refers to a matter of public interest enjoys special protection in view of the importance that this type of speech has in a democratic society. Therefore, in this case, the Court must study whether the possible subsequent liabilities that were applied in the case complied with the requirements set forth in Article 13(2) of the Convention. A.2.5. The subsequent criminal liability imposed upon the alleged victims 116. The Court recalls that on July 20, 2011, the Fifteenth Court issued a judgment of three years imprisonment against the alleged victims for the crime of “serious slanderous insult against authority”, sentencing them to three years in prison and the payment of USD $30,000,000 (thirty million United States dollars). Additionally, El Universo had to pay the sum of USD $10,000,000 (ten million United States dollars). In the judgment, the Temporary Judge who ruled on the case considered that the expressions used by the article had the intention of insulting the then President, and therefore that said statements crossed the limit of the protection of freedom of expression. Similarly, he concluded that said act caused consequential damage and loss of profits to his honor and good reputation (supra par. 64). 117. In this regard, the Court has indicated that criminal prosecution is the most restrictive measure to freedom of expression, therefore its use in a democratic society must be exceptional and reserved for those eventualities in which it is strictly necessary to protect the fundamental legal interests from attacks that damage or endanger them, since to do otherwise would mean an abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State. 177 In other words, from the array of possible measures to demand subsequent liability for potential abusive exercise of the right to freedom of expression, criminal prosecution will only be appropriate in those exceptional cases where it is strictly necessary to protect a pressing social need. 178 118. In effect, the use of the criminal law against dissemination of information of this nature would directly or indirectly constitute intimidation which, ultimately, would limit freedom of expression and would impede public scrutiny of unlawful conduct, such as acts of corruption, abuse of authority, etc. Ultimately, this would weaken public control over the State’s powers, causing grave damage to democratic pluralism. In other words, the Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, par. 126, and Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, supra, par. 114. 176 177 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, par. 76, and Caso Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, supra, par. 119. 178 Cf. Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, supra, par. 120. 40