72. The Court recalls that, regardless of whether the State defines an assertion as a “preliminary objection,” if it is necessary to begin to consider the merits of the case when analyzing it, it is no longer preliminary in nature and cannot be analayzed as such.48 73. This Court has established that, for the fourth instance objection to be admissible, “the petitioner must require the Court to review the ruling of a domestic court owing to an incorrect evaluation of the evidence, the facts or domestic law, without, at the same time, alleging that the said ruling incurred in a violation of international treaties regarding which the Court has competence.” In addition, the Court has established that, when assessing compliance with certain international obligations, an intrinsic interrelationship between the analysis of international law and domestic law may be noted. Consequently, determination of whether the actions of the State’s judicial organs constitute a violation of its international obligations may result in the Court having to examine the respective domestic proceedings to establish their compatibility with the American Convention.49 74. In this case, neither the Commission nor the representatives have requested a review of domestic decisions in relation to the evaluation of evidence or facts, or the application of domestic law. The Court considers that the State’s arguments regarding whether the domestic judicial proceedings were appropriate and effective and whether the remedies were processed and decided correctly must be analyzed when examining the merits of the case pursuant to the American Convention and international law. In addition, whether the payment made to redress pecuniary damage was sufficient and whether acts and omissions existed that violated guarantees of access to justice and that could generate the State’s international responsibility must also be analyzed when examining the merits. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejects this preliminary objection. F. Alleged lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae regarding presumed violations of the prohibition of trafficking in persons F.1. Arguments of the State and observations of the Commission and of the representatives 75. The State asserted that neither the Commission nor the Court were competent to process individual petitions that alleged the supposed violation of international commitments assumed by Brazil to prohibit trafficking in persons, because the Court’s competence was limited to examining supposed violations of the prohibition of the slave trade and traffic in women established in Article 6 of the American Convention, and neither the Commission nor the representatives had alleged that this article had been violated in the instant case. Consequently, it considered that the Court did not have competence to analyze the supposed violation of the international commitments assumed by the State to prevent and combat trafficking in persons when examining the merits of the case. 76. The Commission indicated that it agreed with the State that the Court’s contentious jurisdiction was limited to the Convention and to the instruments of the inter-American sphere, but pointed out that this did not mean that it was impossible to characterize a specific human rights violation according to its definition in other international instruments, provided that the situation violated the Convention or other applicable inter-American instruments, as occurred, for example, in cases of genocide, rape, and child recruitment, and including Cf. Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 6, 2008. Series C No. 184, para. 39, and Case of García Ibarra et al., para. 17. 48 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 222, and Case of García Ibarra et al., paras. 19 and 20. 49 20