82. The representatives also argued, on the basis of Article 8(1) of the Convention, that Mr. Cortez’s right to defense was violated because: (a) “in January of 1997, he did not even have contact with a defense attorney,” and (b) he remained in solitary confinement for 19 days “without access to a defense attorney,” which is not remedied by the fact that these conditions subsequently ended, as the right to defense exists from the very beginning of the proceedings. 83. For these same reasons, as well as because of the statement that “[Mr. Cortez] was not allowed immediate access to a defense attorney” during the 2000 detention either, they understood that the right of the alleged victim to defense assistance, pursuant to Article 8(2)(d) of the Convention, 79 had been violated. Moreover, they asserted that Mr. Cortez’s rights under Article 8(2)(b) of the Convention were violated, as “he was not informed of the reasons he was being detained during either of the detentions.” 84. The representatives also asserted that “at no time” was the principle of the presumption of innocence—established in Article 8(2) of the Convention—respected for Mr. Cortez, and that this “is demonstrated when, despite the military prosecutor’s request for dismissal[,] his pretrial detention was ordered at the beginning of the civilian trial.” 85. In addition, the representatives argued that the length of the trial was unreasonable. They stated that Mr. Cortez was “enmeshed in military and civilian criminal proceedings for over 23 years.” They noted in this regard that: (a) the matter, “an alleged theft of property,” was not especially complex; (b) given the nature of the proceedings, it was not Mr. Cortez’s responsibility to move the process forward himself; (c) the authorities took absolutely no action from 2000 to 2009; and (d) Mr. Cortez suffered due to the length of the proceedings, as they caused psychological and financial harm to him and his family. 86. The State argued that “[w]hen the case was sent to a regular court and decided there, Mr. Cortez Espinoza was guaranteed due process, as the State itself expeditiously remedied the military court’s lack of jurisdiction by transferring the case to a civilian criminal judge.” 80 It added that the body that was involved was independent and impartial. It therefore denied having violated the right to be tried by a competent, independent, and impartial authority. 87. Ecuador also stated that “during the criminal trial, the alleged victim enjoyed basic procedural guarantees, including respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence.” 88. Ecuador asserted that the representatives’ argument about a lack of legal grounds was unsupported, as “the Court of Military Justice and the Constitutional Court each issued substantiated orders to remedy the facts of the case.” 79 In their final written arguments concerning the events of 1997 within the military justice system, the representatives also argued that paragraph (c) of Article 8(2) of the Convention had been violated because “[Mr.] Cortez did [not] have access to his attorney.” In the same document, they referenced paragraph (e) of Article 8(2) in connection with the events of January of 1997, asserting that that provision, in conjunction with paragraph (d) of the same article, was violated by the solitary confinement of Mr. Cortez for a day and his inability to file a request for release. 80 Ecuador added that Mr. Cortez “at no point complained that the judge did not have jurisdiction to try him due to his status as a civilian; nor did he challenge the continuation of the trial by filing the disqualification action established in the domestic legal system. To the contrary, he provided his consent and his express willingness to continue under said authority.” 20