Regarding the first, it stated that the habeas corpus established by the legislation in force at the time was not effective, as it had to be presented before an administrative authority. Regarding the second, it noted that Mr. Cortez had just been released by virtue of a decision of the Constitutional Court on May 11, 2000, after two requests for habeas corpus were denied by the administrative authority and over two months had passed since he was taken into custody. For these reasons, the remedy did not meet “standards of simplicity and speed.” They therefore argued that the State had violated Article 7(6) of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 1(1) and 2. 114. The representatives maintained that while Mr. Cortez was in solitary confinement during his first two detentions, he was deprived of the ability to file judicial remedies. They added that although Mr. Cortez filed two requests for habeas corpus during his third detention, those were ineffective, as they were handled by an administrative authority. Thus, they argued that the State infringed Mr. Cortez’s right to judicial protection, violating Article 25 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1(1). The representatives also argued that Mr. Cortez’s right to due substantiation, established in Article 8(1) of the Convention, was violated when the mayor, “without any justification,” dismissed the habeas corpus requests that had been filed on March 8 and 29, 2000. In their final written arguments, they also asserted that the actions taken in the military jurisdiction violated Article 7(6) of the Convention, as Mr. Cortez “was not brought before a competent judge or court.” 115. The State maintained that Mr. Cortez had access to “various remedies” to inform the authorities about alleged violations of his human rights. 102 It stated that “the majority of these remedies, in particular the remedy of habeas corpus for the 1997 detention, were not utilized by the alleged victim or his family members.” 116. Ecuador also argued that, though the representatives mentioned an “alleged solitary confinement” that would have prevented Mr. Cortez from filing remedies when he was detained, “his attorney appeared on his behalf, communicating his client's acceptance of the continued detention by the military criminal judge as well as his request to not be transferred to the Provisional Detention Center, where he believed his personal integrity would be at risk.” 117. Regarding habeas corpus, the State argued that even though the mayor was not officially the judge, he acted as such, meeting the requirement under the terms of Article 8(1) of the Convention for a competent authority to decide rights, in this case the right to personal liberty. It noted that Mr. Cortez filed remedies for habeas corpus on two occasions, which were effective, as they resulted in the Constitutional Court overturning the prior decisions and ordering his release. 118. The State therefore believed that it had ensured Mr. Cortez’s right to judicial protection. B. Considerations of the Court B.1 Detentions of Mr. Cortez 119. It has been argued that Mr. Cortez was deprived of his liberty on certain occasions between 1997 and 2000: (a) first, in January of 1997; (b) second, on July 11, 1997; and (c) finally, on February 28, 2000. 102 corpus. The State did not specify which remedies it was referring to beyond what is detailed below regarding habeas 26