regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies had been submitted to the Commission at the correct procedural time, prior to the Report on Admissibility. Second, the State argued that if the alleged victims considered that Law 23.982 established a method for the payment of compensation that was contrary to constitutional principles “they should have filed an extraordinary federal appeal, which was the correct proceeding to challenge the constitutionality of a national law.” It added that “had this [appeal] been rejected [they would have had the possibility of filing] a motion for admission of a denied appeal.” 17. Likewise, it indicated that “the mere fact that the alleged victims consider that a domestic remedy would be futile or ineffective for their claims does not demonstrate per se the inexistence or exhaustion of all effective domestic remedies.” In this regard, the State indicated that the analysis of the effectiveness of the remedy cannot be made in an abstract manner, and highlighted that “clear evidence of the adequacy and effectiveness of the extraordinary appeal is provided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice […] issue[d] prior to the judgment that granted compensation to Sebastián Furlan, [which] declared unconstitutional Law 23.982 based on the nature of specific cases which involved the need for medial treatment.” It also emphasized that “the voluntary decision” not to file the “available and appropriate remedy cannot be interpreted as ineffectiveness of that remedy.” 18. The Commission held that this preliminary objection is inadmissible “inasmuch as [the claims of the State] were analyzed in a timely manner” in the admissibility report, in which in which it applied the exception contemplated in Article 46(2) (c) of the Convention. 19. Furthermore, the Commission emphasized that: i) “in the ordinary remedies there was an unwarranted delay of thirteen years [...] in proceedings relating to serious permanent injuries to a child;” ii) “the State did not prove [...] how the extraordinary remedies that it considers should have been exhausted would resolve one of the main claims [...] which was the unwarranted delay,” particularly taking into account that “the consideration and duration of the extraordinary appeal was discretionary”; and iii) “petitioners are not obliged to file extraordinary remedies that are not aimed at [...] remedying the alleged violation.” Regarding the latter, the Commission pointed out that “the purpose of the judicial action” filed by Danilo Furlan was “to obtain compensation for [the] serious and permanent injuries” suffered by his son, as well as for “the duration of the ordinary proceedings.” Finally, the Commission considered that the State’s argument regarding the effectiveness of the extraordinary constitutional motion, to the extent that it might have been successful against the law as applied in other cases, “was time-barred” given that the State “had presented this argument for the first time before the InterAmerican Court.” 20. The representatives stated that this preliminary objection was raised by the State solely “with regard to the method of payment established by Law 23.982,” and therefore “all violations of the Convention identified by the representatives [...] and by the Commission” are excluded. The representatives also held that this objection is formally inadmissible given that the State “abruptly changed [in the proceedings before the Court] the contents of the preliminary objection” filed before the Commission. In this regard, they indicated that in its arguments before the Commission, the State “claimed that an extraordinary appeal should have been lodged for the arbitrariness of the judgment” whereas before the Court the State argued that “an extraordinary appeal should have been filed regarding the unconstitutionality of Law 23.982.” 21. Furthermore, they argued that the available domestic remedies that were appropriate and effective were exhausted “through the filing of the [...] appeal.” Regarding 8