equated with “against the law,” but must be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability.110 92. The Court has stated that in order that a precautionary measure that restricts liberty not be arbitrary, it is necessary that: (i) there are material presumptions of the existence of an unlawful act and of the involvement of the detainee in the act; (ii) the measure meets the four elements of the “test of proportionality”; in other words, the stated purpose of the measure must be legitimate (compatible with the Convention),111 appropriate to comply with the purpose sought, necessary and strictly proportionate112 and (iii) the decision that imposes it is “based on sufficient justification, permitting an evaluation on whether it is in keeping with the conditions indicated.”113 i. Material presumptions of the existence of an unlawful act and of the involvement of the detainee in the act 93. Regarding the first point, the Court has indicated that in order to meet the requisites to restrict the right to personal liberty by means of a precautionary measure such as pre-trial detention, there must be sufficient elements to be able to reasonably presume that an unlawful act had occurred and that the person subjected to the process had participated in that act.114 94. It must be stressed that this presumption is not a legitimate justification, per se, to order a precautionary measure that restricts liberty nor is it an element that is susceptible of undermining the principle of the presumption of innocence set forth in Article 8(2) of the Convention. On the contrary, as found in the comparative law of various countries of the Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 92 and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, para. 355. See also: United Nations, Human Rights Committee. Report N° 458/1991, Case of A. W. Mukong v. Cameron, August 10, 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.8 and Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, December 24, 2012, A/HRC/22/44, para. 61. 110 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 21, 2006. Series C No. 152, para. 89 and Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Series C No. 371, para. 251. 111 Cf. Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 197 and Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. para. 251. 112 Cf. Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137, para. 128 and Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. para. 251. Similarly, the European Court has held that detention will be “arbitrary” when “there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of the authorities”; […] “both the order to detain and the execution of the detention do not genuinely conform with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5(1); […] there must be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention; […and] there is no relationship of proportionality between the ground of detention relied upon and the detention in question. ECHR. Case of James, Wells and Lee v. United Kingdom. Judgment of September 18, 2012, Application N° 25119/09, 57715/09 and 57877/09, paras. 191 to 195 and Case of Saadi v. United Kingdom, Judgment of January 29, 2008, Application N° 13229/03, paras. 68 to 74. 113 Cf. Case of Servellón García et al. v. Honduras, para. 90 and Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, paras. 101 and 103. 114 18