American Convention. The Court notes that the arguments of the judge to substantiate the risk of flight were the quantum of the punishment, the imminence of a trial and the recourses that questioned the judicial independence and impartiality. 115. Regarding the first argument, the Court reiterates that an eventual sentence of 25 years imprisonment, or any other, is not a sufficient standard to justify the risk of flight. The Court, as the European Court, considers that this standard and that of the gravity of the offense cannot justify the imposition of a measure that deprives liberty, since if that were the case it would invert the burden of proof and the detainee would have to show that he or she did not intend to escape justice in order to be tried while in liberty (supra paras. 101 and 105). 116. As to the second, the Court shares the opinion of the Commission when it affirms that it is not possible that the imminence of a trial is an argument to substantiate the risk of flight. The Court considers it settled that the objective of pre-trial detention is to ensure the adequate advance of the proceedings. In this regard, the development of the procedural phases cannot be, per se, a justification to deprive liberty since it would then be a consequence of the entire process and not as an exceptional precautionary measure. 117. Regarding the third argument, the Court considers that, although the Commission claimed that the filing of recourses during criminal proceedings cannot be held against the person being charged nor can it be a justification to maintain pre-trial detention, it was not the remedies themselves that the judge took into account, but rather, as the State claimed, the attitude of the accused towards the judicial authority. The judge specifically considered “the accused’s own statements, in the express sense of not submitting to the judicial authorities charged with resolving his situation, statements made on June 27 […], when giving his statement before this court” (supra para. 113). In view of the above, the Court observes that, although it was not the filing of remedies that was the basis of the measure, which undoubtedly would have been arbitrary, the statements of the accused that indicated that “he was not going to make a statement at the preliminary investigation and he refused to make a statement before [M.P.] because he considered that the latter was not a natural judge to intervene in this case nor in any case in which he was accused” are not specific facts that would indicate the possibility of evading trial and that would justify using this measure over others that are less grave. 118. Similarly, the Court finds that the arguments used to justify the risk of flight are not based on specific facts, objective criteria and adequate arguments. On the contrary, they rest on mere conjectures based on criteria that are not relevant to the particularities of the case and consist more in abstract claims, which would be a manifest and notorious divergence from the standards established by the relevant case law. 119. Moreover, the Court cannot fail to mention that, according to the decision of the Examining Magistrate (supra paras. 22 and 113), neither necessity nor strict proportionality were evaluated since there is no analysis of alternative measures that could have been imposed to guarantee the alleged victim’s appearance to stand trial, such as bail or a restriction to leave the country. 120. In view of the above, the Court holds that the extension of the deprivation of liberty was arbitrary, since the criteria on which the legitimate purpose of the “risk of flight” was founded were abstract and, therefore, contrary to Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Romero Feris. C. Effective judicial remedy 121. The Commission asserted that the decision of August 1, 2001 that denied the request of liberty of the alleged victim and extended the measure, being based on precepts 24