appointment of the judge nor do they clarify why the cases were assigned to the First Magistrate, the Court considers that it is not for the Court establish rules in light of the Convention that define the content of a judicial decision, but rather, as indicated in its case law, that it be a reasoned decision and that it respond to the arguments of the petitioner.162 Notwithstanding the above, it should be stressed that the magistrate of the first instance mentioned, with regard to the recourse, that “the appointment of judges is the exclusive competence of the Political Authorities, whose regular exercise is overseen by other instruments, such as those that belong to constitutional procedural law; for example, the autonomous action of unconstitutionality […].”163 In this regard, the Court does not accept the reasoning of the Commission, since its arguments were correctly answered by the domestic judge. 149. With respect to decisions on the inadmissibility of the writs of cassation, the Court finds the existence of the requirements of admissibility to be reasonable as a mechanism to safeguard legal security and that it is a decision that is within the area of competence of the States, especially since those requisites did not make it impossible for the alleged victim to have his arguments considered and reviewed by a judicial authority (Examining Magistrate and Criminal Chamber) and that they had already been ruled on. 150. The Court, thus, considers that the alleged victim had effective recourses to question the appointment of the First Examining Magistrate and, therefore, the State is not responsible for violating Article 25 of the Convention. B.2. Regarding the recourses on the appointment of temporary judges of the Second Chamber and of the STJC 151. The Court observes, regarding the issue of the appointment of temporary judges, that the defense counsel presented two procedural appeals in the cases included in the factual framework. They are: “motion for the absolute nullity against the composition of the [Second Criminal Chamber]” and “motion for the absolute nullity of the composition of the [STJC].” 152. Like the previously analyzed appeals, the Court considers that the arguments and substantiations of the technical defense of the victim and of the judges in their decisions are similar. 153. The main argument of the defense counsel underlying the appeals was that the terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of the Province were ignored,164 since that norm authorizes the temporary appointment of judges by the Executive Branch for a limited period, but only when the Senate is in recess, which to his knowledge was not the case. 154. With reference to the first matter, the defense counsel filed a motion of nullity before the Second Chamber, which held it without merit because the motion of nullity on the composition of the Chamber was not the appropriate channel.165 A writ of cassation was filed against that decision, which was rejected by the same body because the decision was not Cf. Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 23, 2018. Series C No. 359, para. 169 and Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras, para. 96 162 Cf. First Court of Instruction, Order of June 4, 2001 (evidence file, f. 297). Also mentioned in: First Court of Instruction, Order of September 26, 2000 (evidence file, fs. 252 to 256) and First Court of Instruction, Order 615 of April 5, 2001 (evidence file, fs. 1484 to 1489). 163 Cf. Constitution of the Province of Corrientes. Article 142.- “The members of the Superior Court, Judge of the Chamber, Judges of First Instance and staff of the Public Ministry are appointed by the Executive Branch with the consent of the Senate. […] When a vacancy occurs during a recess of the Senate, the Executive Branch may fill it with temporary staff that terminates sixty days after the installation of the next Legislature, by sending the respective proposal within the thirty days following the installation and the Senate to decide within the same period as of the remittance of the proposal.” 164 165 Cf. Second Criminal Chamber, Order N° 22 of February 22, 2002 (evidence file, fs 349 to 350). 30