proceedings; 454 vi) violation of the right of defense due to the refusal to admit and examine helpful evidence arising from the evidence presented by the Public Prosecutor’s Office; 455 vii) violation of the principle of objectivity and impartiality of the judge; 456 viii) violation of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folios 33956, 33957, 33959, 33965, 33966, 33967, 33968 and 33969) 452 iii) “The appellants alleged that […] the sentencing court failed to comply with the order issued by this same Chamber in decision 2005-878 […] of August 12, 2005, according to which, the trial was to be held without interruptions and by a court appointed solely for that purpose. […] The appellants list each of the suspensions made […] for personal reasons of the defense counsel or the judges […]. They refer to occasions when the members of the court received documents or files to study or sign without the trial being suspended for that purpose [,] [which] led the judges to commit serious errors in the assessment of the evidence […].” The Chamber dismissed the claims, pointing out that “from the trial records, it may be concluded with complete certainty that the court devoted itself exclusively to hearing this matter, and, only exceptionally, its members attended to what they called ‘desk work’, extradition proceedings, pretrial detention hearings or conciliation hearings. […] Likewise, there were circumstances that merited short suspensions or recesses, in all cases, never for more than ten days, as in the previous cases, and which correspond to situations that cannot be avoided, typical of social coexistence and the organization of the Judiciary […]. Bearing in mind that it was a trial [lasting] about 16 months, in which fifteen people participated, [it] took place with reasonable normality and regularity, with the aforementioned exceptions […]” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folios 33970, 33974 and 33975). 453 iv) The Third Chamber held that “held that "[t]he objection cannot be accepted. [...] the complainants rely on the simple description of the alleged error without specifying, in each case, the harm caused, in view of the body of evidence […] in any case, the documents in question were used at the time the expert accounting report was prepared, and therefore their identity was assured despite the loss of the originals. […]” Cf. (evidence file, folio 33976). 454 v) According to the appellant, “[d]uring the trial the court reversed the principle of orality, establishing that the documentary evidence would not be read in its entirety, but only reviewed, unless the interested party expressly requested otherwise. However, they had been prohibited from addressing the court in person […]. In some cases, the reading of documentary evidence was denied despite the defense's request [...].” The Chamber rejected the claim, pointing out that, after "studying the minutes of the proceedings, it could not detect a single occasion in which the defendants or their counsel had been denied their request for the reading of any document […]” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folio 33977). 455 vi) In addition, according to the appellant, the admission of his evidence by the judge in the preparatory stage was partially and arbitrarily revoked. The Chamber referred to the study of the first reason alleged by Mr. Martínez and had already analyzed, and rejected the argument, stating that "having determined that the already sentenced [HDBH] was a public official, [...] the aforementioned document [...] is irrelevant [...]. On the other hand, as regards the plea bargain (criterio de oportunidad) signed by the defendant [WRA], the court's decision to reject it has no bearing [...] on the decision, since the purpose of the document was to demonstrate that the witness had a motive to lie [...].”Regarding the alleged partial revocation, in an arbitrary manner, of the admission of his evidence in the preparatory stage, the Chamber found that “what the court did on that occasion was to order part of the evidence that had been admitted and to correct the work of the Judge in the intermediate stage who had admitted evidence that had not been determined, for example, referring to a plastic bag or an unnamed file. Moreover, the judges described as unfair the conduct of the [...] public defender of the defendant Jorge Martínez Meléndez, who continually gave different content to the evidence, to documents that had already been incorporated. Thus, this was not an illegitimate action by the Court, but rather derived from a detailed study of the evidence offered. Finally, regarding the rejection of the list of persons registered in the Civil Registry under the name [CM...] at this stage of the proceedings it is not reasonable to carry out the procedures of location and summons to trial […]. The same is true of the missing certifications or accounting documents that are also referred to, since, in all cases, they even refer to individual facts that, even if one were to resort to an exercise of hypothetical suppression in the universe of proven facts, [...] the mechanism would remain unchanged.” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folio 33981). 456 vii) The appellant alleged the lack of impartiality of Judge MMN, for “having participated in stages prior to the debate and having issued evaluative criteria on the guilt of the convicted person.” The Chamber pointed out that "[t]hese arguments cannot be considered. [...] On that occasion, the judges did no more than analyze the existence of the conditions that would justify the continuation of the pretrial detention of the co-defendant [MMM…] based on the conviction issued against him, without resorting to value phrases or assumptions. […The assertion] that the judgment found that the transfer of money to the accounts of the Martínez brothers [...] was a conclusion of the conviction that had just been handed down and not the court’s own invention. Thus […] the prior knowledge that [Judge MMN] had of this matter did not imply the formation of an opinion that would subsequently compromise her impartiality […].[T]he rest of the situations denounced do not constitute a violation of the principle of impartiality [...] and, rather, correspond to speculation of the appellants […]” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folio 33982). 103