principle of a natural (impartial) judge; 457 ix) lack of justification for the sentence; 458 x) violation of the principle of legality and criminal classification; 459 xi) lack of substantiation and erroneous application of the legal norms applicable to the purposes of the program; 460 xii) 457 viii) The appellant alleged that Judge MSM "was not appointed as a judge in the Criminal Trial Court of San José, of the First Judicial Circuit, was on paid leave and was not duly sworn in for the position of Judge, in addition to the fact that, in accordance with [...] the Organic Law of the Judiciary, there was no reason for said Judge to act as substitute in this case". The Chamber declared the claim inadmissible. It stated that MSM "was a member of the Court in her capacity as fourth judge, [...] for which reason she had been participating in all the trial hearings. Thus, this was not a mere substitution. [Said] judge is a professional attached to the San José Criminal Court, Desamparados Section, which is a section of the San José Criminal Court, in accordance with [...] the Organic Law of the Judiciary and was sworn in from the moment she was appointed to the position, so it is not true that she was not qualified to hear this matter. Regarding the fact that she was assigned to the trial while on paid leave , [...] this is a way in which the Administration of Justice resolves its problems of lack of placements, or lack of personnel, the important thing being that, for all purposes, the judge meets the requirements stipulated for a member of the Costa Rican judiciary and was assigned to the competent jurisdiction to hear the case.” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folios 33985 and 33986). 458 ix) The appellant alleged that "the court disregarded the rehabilitative function of the sentence by imposing [19...] years of imprisonment […]. The court relied on the same factual elements that it used to establish his guilt, decided the sentence should be exemplary, did not take into account his status as a first-time offender or his psychosocial characteristics, and it rejected all the evidence offered in that regard [...]. […]. The court committed [several errors and contradictions in] its analysis of his guilt, in which it considered that all the defendants had participated in the same way, without any hierarchical relationship [...]. [T]he court ignored [the principle] of sound judgment when analyzing the statement of the witness [ZCC], who claimed to have been intimidated by the defendant [,] […] considering that by that time he was in prison and his file was at a stage in which no witness had to testify [...].”The Chamber referred to the sixth and seventh grounds of the cassation appeal by Mr. Martínez’ public defender, already analyzed, and stated that although “the complainants disagree that their level of participation was taken into account in the imposition of the different penalties, this Chamber does not find any contradiction whatsoever, since […] the fact that all the accused have complete ownership of unlawful act, with different essential functions, does not necessarily imply that they should be subject to the same level of reproach, but rather that the greater the participation, the greater the penalty, and that is the reasoning used by the judges [...]. As for the assessment made regarding the intimidation of a witness, the defendant Jorge forgets that this situation was proven in the judgment, as his himself mentions, so this Chamber is unable to rule otherwise. It is understood that, having established the circumstance, its use for purposes of assessing the amount of the sanction to be imposed is appropriate [...].” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folios 33988, 33990, 33991 and 33992). 459 x) The appellant alleged that the “Criminal Code establishes imprisonment as the only sanction for the crime of embezzlement; therefore, the penalty of disqualification from holding public office is not applicable […],furthermore, by making compliance with the latter subject to the prison sentence, they were prohibited from practicing their profession as attorneys, thus violating their right to work […].”The Chamber referred to the analysis of the same argument raised by the public defender of the co-defendant and indicated that “the claim cannot be upheld [.] [The] Criminal Code, establishes the legal possibility of communicating the personal circumstance of being a public official [...] and, consequently, that his conviction for the crime of embezzlement is legally valid and effective. [...The] conduct of this defendant affected the protected legal interests, undermined probity in exercise of public office […]which legally determines the possibility of being punished concomitantly with the penalty of deprivation of liberty, and a penalty of disqualification for the exercise, functions, and performance of public office. […]” Cf. Decision No. 2008-00232 of the Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, of March 11, 2008, (evidence file, folio 33992). 460 xi) According to the appellant, it was “stated that the funds were not used for the purposes of the program, but were diverted [...]. The adoption of the alternative payment methodology was attributed to him, when according to the documentary evidence, it originated from a collegiate decision of seven persons and several institutions [...]. [N]o appointment [...] to a public office [...] was accredited. [T]he sentencing Court distorted the concept of administrative expense, contemplated in [...] Law 5662 [and...] the Court violated the duty of objectivity and the principle of substantiation in the analysis of the evidence [...],” in particular of testimonies. The Chamber dismissed these arguments. “[A]s for the objectives of the programs and the definition of administrative costs, in light of the regulations, it was determined that these did not include any type of debt accumulated by the beneficiaries, either for payment of professional services or social studies […]. The situation becomes even clearer if we take into account that it was finally demonstrated that the public funds did not reach the hands of those beneficiaries for their housing solutions, but ended up in the hands of the defendants, who, in order to justify many of the disbursements, resorted to the payment of such professional services, as was proven in the sentence, charging the State highly lucrative sums. [...] [I]t was also demonstrated that the accused Martínez Meléndez and the defendant already sentenced, manipulated the institutions, making their members believe that the alternative method of payment was intended to democratize the system [...].The other major issue that arises refers to the legal possibility of including private entities in the programs, an aspect that was 104