the pretrial detention from June 3, 2006, and “until the ruling on the operative part of the judgment.” 517 In its decision, it pointed out that as a sentencing court, it had the power to extend the period of pretrial detention beyond the ordinary terms, as established in the case law of the Constitutional Chamber. 518 Therefore, it stated that it was authorized to deprive the defendant of his liberty to ensure the continuance of the trial, without exceeding the time absolutely necessary to accomplish that purpose. In addition, it justified this extension by pointing out that the danger of flight was still latent and that the crime of which he was accused was subject to severe prison sentences. In this case, the period was extended for approximately 13 more months, until July 17, 2007, the date on which the conviction was handed down. 366. In response to this decision, Mr. Martínez’s defense filed a writ of habeas corpus requesting his release and arguing that “the legal term for which the appellant could be held in pretrial detention [had] expired and [had] exceeded the reasonable time limits […].” 519 In a decision issued on June 23, 2006, the Constitutional Chamber ruled that the trial court acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction “expressly conferred under paragraph 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure” and declared the action inadmissible, since “[…]although the exact duration of the measure adopted by the court is not established, this is not deemed unreasonable or contrary to the principle of proportionality, considering that the trial is in the plenary phase of the proceedings […] and that the purpose of the measure is to ensure that the objectives of the proceeding are met […].” Thus, it confirmed its jurisprudence to the effect that “the purpose of imprisonment […] is to ensure the realization of the trial, for which the time limits set by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 258) do not apply.” 520 367. In this regard, the Court notes, first of all, that the extension of Mr. Martínez’s pretrial detention by the trial court may have been legal, 521 since, apparently the case law of the Constitutional Chamber allowed the extension of pretrial detention based on Article 329 of the CCP, ignoring the requirement contained in said article for such purposes, that the accused be at liberty at the time of ordering the precautionary measure. 522 However, by broadening the assumptions and conditions of infringement of liberty, this case law contravened the pro homine principle. Moreover, by allowing the measure of pretrial detention to be imposed without establishing a specific time limit, the Chamber’s decision of June 23, 2006 disregarded the requirement to justify the necessity and proportionality of the measure, as well as its predictability (supra para. 356). In this regard, the Court has indicated that, as a general rule, the accused should be free while his criminal responsibility is being determined, 523 because the latter enjoys the legal status of innocence. This means that he or she should be treated by the State in a manner consistent with the status of a person who has not been convicted. 524 The Court has also pointed out that the State has the obligation to not restrict the liberty of a detained person beyond the limits strictly necessary to ensure that he does 517 26220). Cf. Decision of the trial court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José, of June 2, 2006 (evidence file, folio Citing Ruling No. 6718-06 of the Constitutional Chamber, of May 18, 2006 (evidence file, folio 26236). Cf. Writ of habeas corpus of June 7, 2006, (evidence file, folio 2129). 520 Cf. Decision No. 2006-008979 of the Constitutional Chamber, of June 23, 2006, (evidence file, folios 2138 and 2139). 521 It should be noted that Article 258 “Extension of pretrial detention” mentioned by the Constitutional Chamber refers to the periods of pretrial detention applicable to the processing of non-complex matters. 522 ARTICLE 329. - Restrictions on the freedom of the accused. If the accused is at liberty, the court may, in order to ensure the holding of the hearing, order his arrest by the police to be remanded in custody; it may likewise vary the conditions under which he enjoys his liberty or impose some of the other precautionary measures provided for in this Code. (Emphasis added) 523 Cf. Case of López Álvarez v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 67, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 130. 524 Cf. Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series C No. 275, para. 157, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 130. 518 519 118