22 all human rights norms, in the strict sense the purpose of the Convention is to establish the obligations and rights protected (Part I) and the means of protection provided for that purpose (Part II), in addition to the pertinent general and transitory provisions to the Convention itself (Part III). 61. We must also bear in mind that each provision of the Convention has its own specific object and purpose, which is consistent with it. Thus, the object and purpose of Article 26 of the Convention is not, as we have already said, to establish a human right, but fundamentally to establish an obligation of the States to ensure the progressive development of the law regarding economic social and cultural rights. 62. And it is in this aspect that the Ruling errs by applying the teleological or functional method of interpretation. Thus, it points out that the interpretation resulting from that method “would be similar to the conclusion reached by means of the literal and systematic interpretation, in the sense that Article 26 recognizes the existence of “rights” that must be ensured by the State to all persons subject to their jurisdiction in the terms established by the American Convention.” However, it is quite clear that the provision in question does not “recognize” rights but merely states that they are “derived” from the OAS Charter without, however, indicating or specifying those rights. 63. Consequently, the Ruling not only makes the teleological or functional method of interpretation prevail over other methods, but also accords the object and purpose that inspires the entire inter-American system of human rights, namely, “the protection of the fundamental rights of human beings,” the attribute of justifying any interpretation of the Convention, disregarding the good faith in which it was signed, the terms employed and their context and even the specific object and purpose of the provision being interpreted. 64. Therefore, we may conclude that the Ruling does not apply the functional or teleological method of interpretation of the Convention or, at least, in the appropriate terms, which obviously has a negative effect on the conclusion reached. D. Supplementary methods of interpretation 65. Finally, regarding supplementary methods of interpretation, it should be emphasized, first of all, that the Ruling does not consider these as part of the subjective method of treaty interpretation, as contemplated in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, but rather as a separate method or rule of interpretation. 66. In second place, it should be emphasized that, as mentioned previously, the Ruling does not clearly and expressly reflect what happened at the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, which adopted the final text of the Convention.127 67. We may conclude, therefore, that the preparatory work of the Convention never included the economic, social and cultural rights “derived” from the standards of the OAS Charter- among them the right to social security - within its protection system, which only relates to the civil and political rights “recognized” in the Convention. 127 Para. 32, i) to m).