5 expresses, and the debates that have arisen based on its provisions. Despite that intention, it is clear that the validity and obligatory nature of a norm cannot depend on whether it is mentioned in any specific judgment. In other words, even if the intention is to omit it, this does not in the least affect its existence or binding nature. c) Evolutive interpretation and pro persona principle 21. The idea of overcoming the problems of the justiciability of the ESCR based on an evolutive and supposedly “pro persona” interpretation of Article 26 of the ACHR has been a constant for those who support this thesis. However, this claim entails a basic problem, because it fails to take into account that, to interpret a treaty correctly, it is necessary to have recourse to other methods of interpretation that exist in international law, because the evolutive method is not the only one that should be taken into consideration. 22. Regarding methods of interpretation that should be taken in account, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establish the main methods. The Inter-American Court has incorporated these into its case law;12 thus, in addition to the evolutive method, it has used other interpretation criteria such as literal interpretation, systematic interpretation, and teleological interpretation. 23. In this regard, it should be pointed out that, to interpret a norm, it is not sufficient to use just one of the different methods of interpretation that exist, because these methods are complementary and all of equal rank. Indeed, in the aforementioned concurring opinion, I analyzed13 Article 26 of the ACHR based on all the methods of interpretation, and this revealed that it does not permit a direct justiciability of the ESCR, because the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court in this regard is regulated by Article 19(6) of the Protocol. 24. Consequently, this point is also fairly controversial in the instant judgment because it merely uses one method of interpretation, disregarding one of the most basic rules of public international law, which is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In addition, it does not explain or argue why it seeks to make an interpretation of the treaty using a single methodology. Moreover, this is unusual for the Inter-American Court which, on different occasions, has made interpretations based on all the methods established. 25. Lastly, I stress that this case does not include an interpretation that provides the most protection for the norm that permits the application of the pro persona principle. This is because the pro persona principle should be applied when the Court is faced with two possible interpretations that are both valid and correct. Specifically what I have demonstrated is that the direct justiciability of the ESCR using Article 26 of the Convention is not a valid interpretation because the intention is to derive a normative principle that does not correspond to the norm. 14 In other words, the pro persona principle cannot be used to validate an interpretive option that does not emanate from the norm and that, to the contrary, entails its modification. C. LACK OF PERTINENCE OF THE SPECIFIC CASE 26. Having described my general arguments in this matter, I will now present the reasons why I considered that this case, in particular, possessed various complex features that meant that it A good example of the correct use of the methods of treaty interpretation can be found in Advisory Opinion No. 21 on the Entitlement of Legal Entities to Hold Rights under the Inter-American Human Rights System. 12 13 In this regard, concurring opinion, Case of González Lluy et al. v. Ecuador, paras. 23 to 28. Similarly, see: Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 78. 14