At the root of the acts of violence and discrimination [… based on sexual orientation or gender identity] lies the intent to punish based on preconceived notions of what the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity should be, with a binary understanding of what constitutes a male and a female or the masculine and the feminine, or with stereotypes of gender sexuality.130 93. Violence against LGBTI people has a symbolic purpose; the victim is chosen in order to communicate a message of exclusion or subordination. On this point, the Court has indicated that the use of violence for discriminatory reasons has the purpose or effect of preventing or annulling the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the person who is the object of the discrimination, regardless of whether that person identifies themself with a determined category.131 This violence, fed by hate speech, can result in hate crimes.132 94. The Court notes also that, at times, it may be difficult to distinguish between discrimination due to sexual orientation and discrimination due to gender expression. Discrimination due to sexual orientation may be based on a real or perceived sexual orientation, so that it includes cases in which a person is discriminated against owing to the perception that others have of their sexual orientation. 133 This perception may be influenced, for example, by clothing, hairstyle, mannerisms or behavior that do not correspond to traditional or stereotypical gender standards or that constitute a non-normative gender expression. In this case, third parties could have associated the presumed victim’s gender expression with a specific sexual orientation. 95. In the instant case, the arguments concerning discrimination crosscut the other alleged violations; consequently, the Court will take them into account throughout the judgment. VII-2 RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY134 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 96. The Commission argued that the deprivation of liberty of the presumed victim was unlawful because “the police intervention and detention of Azul Rojas Marín was not recorded in the logbook as required by article 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, the Commission considered that her retention for identification purposes “was based on subjective perceptions” that bore no relationship to the purposes established in the Code. It added that the police action “was discriminatory” because the state officials “not only used physical force against her, but also attacked her verbally with repeated references to her sexual orientation,” so that the detention was also arbitrary. 97. The representatives argued that Azul Rojas Marín was detained owing to “discrimination based on sexual orientation and non-normative gender expression,” because (OSCE), Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region – Incidents and Responses, 2006 Annual Report, OSCE/ODIHR, Warsaw, 2007, p. 53. Report of the United Nations Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity, Víctor Madrigal-Borloz, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/43, May 11, 2018, para. 48. 130 Cf. Case of Perozo et al. v. Venezuela, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 28, 2009. Series C No. 195, para. 158, and Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra, para. 79. 131 In this regard, the Court has stressed that “discriminatory speech and the resulting attitudes based on stereotypes of heteronormativity and cisnormativity with different degrees of radicalization, lead to the homophobia, lesbophobia and transphobia that encourage such hate crimes.” Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra, para. 47. 132 133 Cf. Case of Flor Freire v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 120. 134 Article 7 of the Convention. 26