by broadly interpreting Article 7(1), and in close relation to Article 11, stating that the latter includes a comprehensive concept of freedom (supra para. 59). 134. This Court considers that the rights to personal liberty and privacy of Sandra Pavez Pavez were affected in different ways. First, because the revocation of her certificate of suitability was specifically due to her sexual orientation (supra para. 118). At this point, it should be recalled that sexual orientation and sexual identity are linked to the concept of freedom and the right of all human beings to self-determination and to freely choose the options and circumstances that give meaning to their existence, according to their own convictions, as well as the right to protection of privacy (supra paras. 58 and 63). Ms. Pavez Pavez’s private life, and specifically her sexual orientation, was exposed in the same resolution in which the Vicariate of San Bernardo revoked her certificate of suitability (supra para. 24). 135. Secondly, her sexual life was also subject to interference by the Vicariate for Education, which allegedly urged her to end her homosexual relationship and made her continued employment as a Catholic religion teacher conditional upon her undergoing medical or psychiatric therapy (supra para. 24). Such conduct is totally unacceptable from a perspective of a State governed by the rule of law, where human rights must be respected. 136. Regarding the rights to have equal access to public service and to work, this Court finds the following: a) Sandra Pavez Pavez held a teaching position in a public educational establishment, and was paid with public funds; b) the teaching position she held was as a tenured teacher; c) after the revocation of the certificate of suitability, her position was reassigned in accordance with the provisions of her employment contract and she was appointed acting Inspector General; d) she has been prevented from teaching Catholic religion classes as a consequence of the revocation of the certificate of suitability, and e) in 2011 she was tenured in the position of Inspector General (supra para. 28). 137. The State disputes her status as a public servant due to the fact that her employment was governed by a private law contract and not a public law contract. However, for this Court, the relevant point is that Sandra Pavez Pavez held a position as a public education teacher, in a public school, and was paid with public funds. In this sense, the nature of the functions she performed were those of a public servant, whose access and tenure in a position depended ultimately on the decision of a State institution; therefore she enjoyed the protections established in Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention, which recognizes the right of access to public service under conditions of equality. 138. This Court finds that, after the revocation of her certificate of suitability, Sandra Pavez Pavez continued to perform a public function and that, a priori, she did not suffer any deterioration in her employment contract, since her reassignment of functions took the form of a promotion, with a higher salary and more responsibilities. The change of contract from incumbent to interim lasted for four years and only related to the position of Inspector General. According to the argument of the State, which was not challenged by the Commission or the representatives, this was the common procedure for the position of Inspector General, for all teachers, and not only for her. Moreover, according to what was reported, she was promoted to the position from within the same teaching staff and commissioned as inspector general, being first and foremost a tenured teacher at the school. 139. In view of the above, this Court finds that Sandra Pavez Pavez’s right of access to public service under equal conditions was not affected, since she was not dismissed from her job. Moreover, the reassignment of her duties was carried out in accordance with the terms of her employment contract, which did not specify that she had been hired as a Catholic religion teacher, but as a teacher. 140. Notwithstanding the foregoing, and in line with the content of the right to work discussed previously (supra paras. 88, 89 and 90), the Court considers that this right was compromised to the extent that the reassignment of duties experienced by Sandra Pavez Pavez undermined her teaching vocation and constituted a form of demotion in her job. The fact that her employment contract did not specify that she was a Catholic religion teacher, that it envisaged the possibility that her duties could be reassigned, and that she could have continued teaching classes of other religions if she had been granted certificates of suitability from religious communities of other faiths, does not change the conclusion that the new duties assigned to her were the consequence of a different treatment based 36