the decisions taken pursuant to Decree 924 are in line with the rights and principles contained in the Convention and that the State’s control over such acts is established in a clear and objective manner. 184. Based on the considerations in the preceding paragraph, and as it has done in other cases, 194 this Court deems it necessary to order the State, within two years from notification of this judgment, to clearly specify or regulate, through legislative or other measures, the remedy, procedure and jurisdictional competence for challenging the decisions of public educational institutions regarding the appointment or removal of teachers of religious education as a result of the issuance or revocation of a certificate of suitability by a religious authority, under the provisions of Article 9 of Decree 924 of 1983. Within the framework of these remedies, the authorities must have the power to carry out an adequate control of conventionality over the decisions of public educational establishments regarding the appointment or removal of religious education teachers as a consequence of the issuance or withdrawal of a certificate of suitability. D. Other measures requested 185. The Commission requested that the State be ordered to reinstate Sandra Pavez Pavez in the position she held as a teacher in a public institution, clarifying that this should be done only if she wishes, and in agreement with her. 186. The representatives indicated that they agreed with everything stated by the Commission in the Merits Report. 187. In its final written arguments, the State referred to the request for the reinstatement of Ms. Pavez, noting that this specific measure and its scope are not clear. It affirmed that such measure was inappropriate since Ms. Pavez was never dismissed as a teacher, and that the proposed measure would imply appointing a teacher of Catholic religion who “does not enjoy the confidence and, in the opinion of the religious authorities, does not represent that faith.” It argued that this would be a violation of religious freedom and a discriminatory measure based on religious grounds. 188. The Court considers that the issuance of this judgment and the reparations ordered in this chapter are sufficient and adequate to remedy the violations suffered by the victim, and therefore does not deem it necessary to order additional measures. E. Compensation E.1. Pecuniary damage 189. The Commission requested that the State be ordered to make full reparation for the human rights violations declared in the Merits Report, including the pecuniary aspects. It added that the pecuniary damage should take into account the differences in the amounts of the salaries and social benefits that Ms. Pavez had received as a teacher, and that the State should adopt the corresponding compensation measures. 190. The representatives requested that the State be ordered to pay, as part of the pecuniary damage, the costs of the psychiatric and psychological therapy incurred by the victim since 2007. 191. In its final written arguments, the State argued that the Commission’s request was inadmissible inasmuch as the victim did not suffer a direct or indirect financial loss as a result of the reassignment of her duties, nor did she lose her wages and benefits as a teacher. As for the request of the representatives, the State denied that it was the cause of the “alleged losses” for which reparations were sought, and therefore the request would be inappropriate. Furthermore, it alleged that the victim could have availed herself of the State’s medical and mental health services, through Chile’s social security system. 194 See, for example, Case of the Former Employees of the Judiciary v. Guatemala, supra, para. 144. 45