192. In its case law, this Court has developed the concept of pecuniary damage, which encompasses the loss of or detriment to the income of the victims, the expenses incurred owing to the facts, and the consequences of a pecuniary nature that have a causal nexus with the facts of the case. 195 193. In view of the circumstances of this case, the Court considers it reasonable to order the State to pay compensation for consequential damage in favor of Sandra Pavez Pavez, for the psychological therapies that she had to undergo as a result of the facts of the case. Bearing in mind that the information provided by the representatives does not allow the Court to establish with certainty the amount of the pecuniary damage caused by the facts examined in this case, the Court sets in equity the amount of USD$ 5,000.00 (five thousand United States dollars) in favor of Sandra Pavez Pavez. E.2. Non-pecuniary damage 194. The Commission requested that the State be ordered to make full reparation for the human rights violations declared in its Merits Report in the non-pecuniary aspect, requesting, in addition, that it be required to adopt the corresponding compensation measures. 195. The representatives requested that the State compensate the victim for the suffering she endured as a result of the discrimination to which she was subjected, exposing her private life and harming her professional career. In their final written arguments they also explained that the events caused Ms. Pavez Pavez severe trauma for many years, and that since 2007 she has held the position of inspector general on an interim basis, “essentially a precarious and unstable” situation. In view of the foregoing, they proposed an award of USD$30,000.00 alleging the similarity of the present case with the case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. 196. The State, in its final written arguments, considered this request inadmissible, maintaining that it is not internationally responsible in the instant case. 197. In its case law, the Court has established that non-pecuniary damage may include both the suffering and afflictions caused to the direct victim and his family, and the impairment of values of great significance for the individual, as well as any alterations of a non-pecuniary nature in the living conditions of the victim or his family.186 Moreover, since it is not possible to assign a precise monetary equivalent to non-pecuniary damage, this can only be compensated, for the purposes of comprehensive reparation to the victims, through the payment of an amount of money or the delivery of goods or services that can be valued in money, as determined by the Court in reasonable application of judicial discretion and in terms of equity. 196 198. Considering the circumstances of this case, the nature and seriousness of the violations committed, the suffering caused to the victim, 197 and the time that has elapsed since the facts occurred, the Court finds it reasonable to order the State to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage in favor of Sandra Pavez Pavez. Consequently, the Court establishes, in equity, the sum of USD$ 30,000.00 (thirty thousand United States dollars) for non-pecuniary damage, in favor of Sandra Pavez Pavez. This amount includes a sum of money to enable Sandra Pavez Pavez to cover the costs of the necessary psychological treatment (infra para. 175). 195 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of February 22, 2002.Series C No. 91, para. 43, and Case of Digna Ochoa and Family Members v. Mexico, supra, para. 181. 196 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs, supra, para. 84, and Case of Cuya Lavy et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 223. During the public hearing, Sandra Pavez Pavez stated that she lived “with a tremendous depression when all this happened, it also affected the fears that one has of coming out publicly, running the risk of being hurt by anyone in the street.” She also stated that she was affected by “having lost (her…) right to teach, (…and), what the media says.” Similarly, with respect to her position as inspector, she said that she felt that she “was not doing what [she] [...] liked, [...], that it was not what (her) inner self felt, it was like doing something because you have to do it and because you have to earn money and make a living, but was not (her) inner essence. (She) felt she totally lost (her) dignity as a human being.” 197 46