responsibilities. 21 Thus, the Court analyzed the concept of occupational demotion, although it did not specify its scope and content, within the context of Article 23 of the Convention. Despite the foregoing, and without further explanation, the Court resumes its analysis of the alleged occupational demotion in relation to Article 26 ACHR, taking into account two distinct elements. 7. Indeed, the Court found that the violation of the right to work was proven when it considered that, “[…] the reassignment of duties experienced by Sandra Pavez Pavez undermined her teaching vocation and constituted a form of demotion in her job. The fact that her employment contract did not specify that she was a Catholic religion teacher, that it envisaged the possibility that her duties could be reassigned, and that she could have continued teaching classes of other religions if she had been granted certificates of suitability from religious communities of other faiths, does not change the conclusion that the new duties assigned to her were the consequence of a different treatment based on her sexual orientation and not on objective grounds of the requirements of the service” 22 (emphasis added). This assertion is imprecise and lacks any legal basis, as I will explain below. 8. From the conclusions set forth in paragraphs 138 to 140, it seems to be understood that the change in working conditions to the detriment of Ms. Pavez relates not only to a reduction in remuneration, in the stability offered by the contract or in the rank of her position, but also to the fact that she could no longer carry out the work that was her vocation, and to changes in her position based on discriminatory criteria. In order to reach this conclusion, the judgment does not provide a solid basis in light of the inter-American corpus iuris; it blurs the content of Article 23 of the Convention and reiterates the analysis of paragraph 1 of the merits of the judgment. 9. In the first place, with regard to a person’s vocation as an area protected by the right to work, the Court’s failure to substantiate its position is evident. The judgment does not explain what this concept refers to, whether it is associated with a person’s profession in general, or with the scope of a specific contract; nor does it indicate the scope of this obligation for the State, or what its limits are in relation to the contract or the need for the service. Even more serious, the Court does not explain which provisions directly or indirectly recognize vocation as part of the right to work in the field of international human rights law. Furthermore, the Court does not specify on the basis of which criteria of interpretation it is possible to conclude that Article 26 - in relation to Articles 45(b) and (c), 46 and 34(g) of the OAS Charter, 23 and the precedents of the cases of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, Dismissed Employees of PetroPerú et al. v. Peru, San Miguel Sosa et al. v. Venezuela, Spoltore v. Argentina and Workers of the Fireworks Factory in Santo Antônio de Jesus and their Families v. Brazil - protects vocation as part of the right to work. On the contrary, in order to provide a legal basis for the violation of Article 26, the Court refers to paragraphs 88 to 90 of the decision, in which it only mentions the prohibition of discrimination in labor matters, leaving its position without legal support. 10. Secondly, the Court blurs the content of Article 23 of the Convention. As I explained earlier, the judgment mentioned the notion of occupational demotion both when referring to the right of access to public service and to the right to work; however, Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 4, 2022. para. 138. 21 Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 4, 2022. para. 140. 22 23 It should be recalled that the State of Chile did not ratify the Protocol of San Salvador. 4