CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE EDUARDO VIO GROSSI REGARDING THE ORDER OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF JULY 5, 2011 CASE OF BUENO ALVES v. ARGENTINA MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENT I concur in this opinion with the “Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, of July 5, 2011, Case of Bueno Alves V. Argentina, Monitoring of Compliance with Judgment,” noting that the inadmissibility of the orders of the decisions of the first and second instance, issued in the domestic legal system of the Republic of Argentina in 2003 and 2004, that declared the statute of limitations prior to the issuance of the ruling in this case and provided by the State during the monitoring of compliance, heeds, in addition to that presented in the Order, (Considering clause 46) to the principle of International Law wherein no State may take advantage of its own negligence,1 and therefore, such decisions contain facts that, having been recognized by the State, should have been invoked during the processing of the claim that led to the case that is now being monitored, that is, prior to its issuance. And, the invocation of the resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina on July 11, 2007, which in the context of an appeal against those decisions affirmed them, making them final, is also inadmissible based on the merits, specifically because it consists of and considers as final, the process where the decisions are rendered that were ratified. All of these are circumstances of which the State was presumably aware and did not report to the Court at the aforementioned time, to which, in this respect, the aforementioned principle of International Law applies. 1 This principle is expressed, among other legal texts, in Art. 61(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which states: “An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.” And in Art.51(1) ICSID which states: “(1) Either party may request revision of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary-General on the ground of discovery of some fact of such a nature as decisively to affect the award, provided that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the Tribunal and to the applicant and that the applicant's ignorance of that fact was not due to negligence.”