was held in the illegal detention camp, without taking into account the time he was subjected to a regimen of de facto supervised release (supra para. 35). Mr. Almeida filed a special appeal before the National Federal Contentious Administrative Chamber, which was denied. 51. Following the Supreme Court of Justice’s change in its stance on the matter with the Noro case in 1997, Mr. Almeida filed a special appeal of the resolution of the National Federal Contentious Administrative Chamber, properly referencing the change in caselaw. However, his appeal was denied (supra para. 39) and the motion for reconsideration of dismissal of appeal filed before the Supreme Court of Justice was declared inadmissible. Based on the precedent set in the 2003 Robasto case, the administrative authorities began systematically applying the criteria of treating de jure and de facto situations of supervised release the same for the purposes of establishing the benefits provided for under Law 24,043. This encouraged Mr. Almeida to present to the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights an appeal for revocation of the decisions previously adopted. The appeal was denied on the grounds that Mr. Almeida was requesting modification of a judicial judgment (supra 41). 52. However, for his wife, Claudia Graciela Estevez, whose factual situation was exactly the same as that of Mr. Almeida and who, in 1999, had also been denied in the administrative forum the compensation established in Law 24,043 with regard to the amount of time she was subject to de facto supervised release, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights decided via a resolution of May 22, 2015, to grant her the benefit, in application of the precedents established in the Noro and Robasto cases. That is, in response to a factually identical situation regarding the supervised release to which both Mr. Almeida and Ms. Estevez were subjected, the former was treated differently without justification regarding the benefit provided for under Law 24,043, with respect to the period during which he was subjected to a regimen of de facto supervised release, in violation of Article 24 of the Convention. 53. Thus, the State’s recognition entails acknowledging that Mr. Almeida did not have access to an effective remedy or process enabling application of the new interpretive criteria for Law 24,043 to his case and definitively putting an end to the inequality to which he had been subjected by the failure to take into account the days during which he was under de facto supervised release when calculating the compensation provided for under that law. The Court therefore concludes that the State was responsible for the violation of articles 8(1), 24, and 25(1) of the Convention, in relation to articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Almeida. VIII REPARATIONS 54. Based on Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the Court has indicated that any violation of an international obligation that has caused harm entails the duty to make adequate reparation and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility.57 55. Reparation of the harm caused by the violation of an international obligation requires, insofar as possible, full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which consists in the restoration of the previous situation. If this is not possible, as in most cases of human rights violations, the Court will determine measures to guarantee the rights that have been violated and to redress the Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 21, 1989. Series C No. 7, para. 25, and Case of Olivares Muñoz et al. v. Venezuela, supra, para. 142. 57 16