But, it is logical to consider that in an administrative structure countless officers intervene, all of these fulfill specific roles designated to them, but with the indisputable characteristic that their functions are exercised add follow the orders of their respective superiors. In the present case, this situation is evident because the assignment of sanitation services to the public entities of the District was always within the domain and subject to the decision of the Mayor of Bogota, who also had a second position as the member of the Board of 40 Directors of EAAB, as demonstrated by all the evidence in the process (…).” 86. In relation to the second charge, it stated that “the prevalence of the principle of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition is not an assumption as argued by the defendant; to the contrary, it is a principle of mandatory compliance under the Constitution and the law, and its only restriction or adaptation is in the implementation of Areas of Exclusive Service (Áreas de Servicio Exclusivo), in accordance with the 41 requirements and parameters provided in the legal framework (…).” It also considered that “Decree 564 of 2012 did restrict the principle of freedom of enterprise in the field of public domestic services, because it repeats that the entire administration and responsibility of this service was transferred to the Water and Sewers Company of Bogota (EAAB), and that the only possibility for private operators to participate was via subcontracts with the UAESP, which was in accordance with the conditions and percentages that the District determined, this, because the public operator was unable to take the entire operation of the city as was initially decided by the disciplined individual.” It added, as evidence, that the percentage of the provision of the service by the public operator, between December 18, 2012, and April 22, 2013, was 52.62% of the city, whereas on April 22, 2013, and afterwards, the percentage of the provision of the service was 63.15% where, 42 for example, the private operator ATESA S.A., no longer provided the service. 87. In relation to the third charge, the Chamber stated, by issuing Decree 570, the Mayor committed a very serious offense because “he knew that compacting vehicles were needed for the sanitation service,” and because his high rank would convey a message that “it was a duty to comply with the norms 43 contained in the legal framework, among these, Decrees 948 of 1995, and 1713 of 2002.” It stated that “it was not the exceptional and unforeseen circumstances of the transition in the entry into operation of EAAB or the denial of the private operators to return equipment, rather, it was the incapacity of the District to take over 44 the sanitation service, and this situation arose because of decisions adopted by the Mayor of Bogota.” 88. Finally, it referred to the imposed sanction, indicating that, (…) three disciplinary offenses were committed, and considering that the last one was not committed with malice, rather as a very serious offense, the Disciplinary chamber imposed a sanction of 15 years. In other words, it could be stated that it was twelve years for the first offense; two more years for the second; and for the third, another year; a graduation of the sanction adjusted proportionally as provided in subsection 2 of Article 47 of the Single 45 Disciplinary Code, for those cases known as concurso material heterogéneo.” 89. In a January 15, 2014, interview with the newspaper “El Tiempo”, the Inspector General of Nation was asked if Mayor Petro was leaving because of his leftist political views or because he is a bad mayor, 40 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 145. Annex 2 to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 41 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 64. Annex 2 to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 42 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 203. to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 43 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 373. to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 44 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 363. Annex 2 to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 45 Annex 2. Decision on the petition seeking reversal of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Office of the Nation’s Inspector General, of January 13, 2014, p. 15. Annex 2 to the additional observations from the petitioners on the merits of March 9, 2017. 16