disciplinary proceeding. The applicable legislation determines that the disciplinary authority issues the charges when “the offense is objectively determined” and “there is evidence that compromises the responsibility of the defendant.” This means, evidently, that from the time that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Inspector’s Office formulated a statement of charges, it had already determined a position about the disciplinary liability of Mr. Petro Urrego. In light of said situation, the IACHR observes that these did not act in their materially jurisdictional function free from all prejudice and, consequently, impartially. The Commission observes that the design through which the same authority that files charges is the one that decides culpability, and the manner in which it operated in the present case, with the imposition of severe sanctions i.e., disqualification for 15 years and the dismissal of a popularly-elected Mayor, imposed a disproportionate burden on the defendant to demonstrate, to the same authority that filed the charges, that he did not commit the associated offenses. This also runs contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence applicable to all sanctions proceedings. 135. By virtue of the above, the IACHR concludes that the State of Colombia violated the right that a sanctioning decision is made by an impartial authority as well as the principle of the presumption of innocence. 136. Second, the Commission recalls that the alleged victim filed an appeal for reconsideration against the sanctions decision of December 9, 2013, the only recourse that proceeded against the judgement of sole instance issued by the Inspector General of the Nation as maximum disciplinary authority before the same became res judicata. Nonetheless, the Commission observes that said recourse, in accordance with the law, is solved by the same authority that imposed the sanction, as occurred in the present case where the Inspector General of the Nation denied the appeal. The Commission recalls that the right to appeal implies an examination by a different and superior authority, and therefore, the appeal for reconsideration does not satisfy one of the basic, minimum requirements of Article 8(2)(h). 137. On the other hand, the Commission observes that after the denial of the appeal for reconsideration, on March 31, 2014, the alleged victim filed a request for nullification and reversal of the administrative sanctioning act. Nonetheless, over three years and six months the action was filed, it has yet to be resolved. 138. The Commission recalls that to determine the fairness of a timeframe, Inter-American jurisprudence has elaborated four elements: a) the complexity of the matter; b) the procedural activity of the interested party; c) the conduct of the judicial authorities; and d) impairment of the legal situation of the person involved in the proceedings.98 In relation to the first element, the Commission observes that the State did not justify the delay, demonstrating that the request of nullification and reversal was complex, and neither can that be determined from the case file. In relation to the second and third elements, the Commission highlights that since the action was filed over 3 years and 6 months have passed, and to-date, the Chamber has only “provisionally” suspended the sanctions decision. The Commission does not have information to demonstrate that the State Council has acted diligently to resolve the action, because, as stated, the State did not attempt to justify the delay. On the other hand, from the case file, there are no elements to indicate that the delay is attributable to Mr. Petro Urrego. 139. In relation to the fourth element, the Commission underscores that the delay had an impact on the juridical situation of the alleged victim, since the disqualifying sanction that was imposed would prevent him from exercising his right to passive suffrage as a presidential candidate in the elections of 2018 as, according to the petitioners, is his interest. This situation is not changed by the provisional suspension of the administrative sanction because Mr. Petro Urrego is still in a situation of uncertainty about the final result of his action, which could be rejected. This uncertainty impacts the possibility of initiating a presidential campaign, while the validity of disqualification sanctions remains pending a judicial decision. On the other hand, even if his participation were allowed, due to the criminal law amendment recently adopted, he could 98 IACHR, Report No. 75/15, Case 12.923. Merits. Rocío San Miguel Sosa et al. Venezuela. October 28, 2015, para.200; I/A Court of H.R., Case of Kawas Fernández v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 3, 2009, Series C No. 196, para. 112. 26