propose inverting traditional rules of evidence in three ways: 1) applying a presumption that discrimination exists where alleged. In other words, in these cases, there should not be a presumption of the legality of an administrative act; 2) imposing the burden of proof on the defendant to demonstrate that there was no discrimination; and 3) expanding the means of proof, such as the indications of the alleged discrimination, 106 taking into consideration that in such cases it is incredibly difficult to obtain direct evidence. 144. The Commission recalls that the alleged victim argued during the domestic proceedings that the disciplinary actions against him by the Office of the Inspector General had a political and discriminatory motivation, and that the objective was to punish him for his political ideology; i.e., these proceedings had a covert purpose. The Commission additionally underscores that after the sanctioning decision of December 9, 2013, on December 31, 2013, the alleged victim requested evidence to demonstrate the selectiveness and covert purpose of the disciplinary proceedings, such as the number of disciplinary proceedings that were advanced by the issuance of decrees similar to those issued by the alleged victim and the type of sanctions imposed. Nonetheless, his requests for that evidence were rejected because of their “untimeliness.” 145. The Commission observes that the alleged selective and discriminatory application of the disciplinary powers based on the political affiliation of Mr. Petro Urrego would have materialized by imposing a disciplinary action on December 9, 2013, thus, the law should have allowed submitting new evidence about this matter after the sanction, either through the same administrative avenue or through a judicial recourse. The IACHR observes that the information that would have supported proof of said allegation is essentially in the power of the State. 146. Thus, in the present case, Mr. Petro Urrego did not have the evidence that would have allowed him to develop, at the administrative level, his allegation of discrimination; whilst through the judiciary, due to the delay already analyzed, he has not had a decision on this matter. 147. By virtue of the above, the Commission concludes that the State of Colombia violated the right enshrined in Article 25(1) of the American Convention in conjunction to Articles 24 and 1(1) of the same instrument to the detriment of Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego. V. CONCLUSIONS 148. The Commission concludes that the State of Colombia is responsible for violation of the rights to fair trial, political rights, equal protection, and judicial protection as provided by Articles 8(1), 8(2), 8(2)(h), 23(1), 23(2), and 25(1) of the American Convention in conjunction with the obligations established in Articles 24, 1(1), and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego. VI. RECOMMENDATIONS THE INTERAMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS RECOMMENDS THAT THE STATE OF COLOMBIA, 1. To annul the administrative sanctioning acts that imposed sanctions of disqualification on Mr. Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego, so he may freely exercise his political rights, including the right to passive suffrage. 2. To integrally repair the violations of rights declared in the present report, including their material and immaterial aspects. 106 See expert witness statement by Roberto Saba at the public hearing in the Case of Rocío San Miguel et al. v. Venezuela before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 28