addition, the representative argued that, in this specific case, the judges not only violated the principle of subsidiarity of a prison sentence, but also that of equality and nondiscrimination, the principle of the best interests of the child, and the special measures of protection required by Article 19 of the American Convention, since César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Nuñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández were sentenced to life imprisonment without any distinction having been made in relation to the punishment applicable to an adult. Moreover, the representative indicated that the behavior of the presumed victims during the tutelary treatment period was not considered when determining the sentence. 137. The representative also indicated that the State had violated the principle of deprivation of liberty for the shortest time appropriate and the principle of periodic review of the detention measures by imposing an absolute sentence such as life imprisonment on the youths. In this regard, Argentine legislation allows for early release by means of parole, but after a 20-year sentence has been served, and this also depends on “fulfillment of the conditions imposed and evaluated by the prison service itself.” In addition, the representative argued the violation of the principle of lesser criminal responsibility of children in conflict with the law, since “the Juvenile Criminal Regime […] establishes that juveniles can be sentenced to the same prison sentences as adults”; in other words, for “the determination of offenses, and the establishment of punishments and their execution, this system refers to the adult system, without any type of distinction.” Furthermore, the representative argued that the sentence to life imprisonment violated the principle of social rehabilitation and reform as an essential purpose of the punishment. Based on all the above, she considered that Argentina had violated, among others, the rights recognized in Articles 1(1), 2, 5(6), 19 and 24 of the American Convention. 138. The State acknowledged that there had been a “judicial error” in the specific case of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández, because “the courts involved […] sentenced them to life imprisonment, which was forbidden by the principle of nulla poena sine culpa, according to the criteria of the Supreme Court of Justice [of Argentina] in the 'Maldonado’ judgment.” The State also acknowledged that this “same shortcoming is apparent in the context of the execution of the sentences, because both the technical defense and the judges concerned based their interventions on norms that were manifestly inapplicable to the case.” Lastly, it indicated that there were “certain inconsistencies in the argument that the presumed victims had been subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by imposing sentences of life imprisonment on them,” because “under international law, it is not prohibited to apply such punishments.” B. Considerations of the Court 139. The Court observes that the disputes described in this section are not intended to contest the criminal responsibility of César Alberto Mendoza, Claudio David Núñez, Lucas Matías Mendoza, Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal and Ricardo David Videla Fernández, but rather the imposing of life sentences and reclusion for life on them. In this regard, the State acknowledged its responsibility for the violation of the principle of nulla poena sine culpa because, in its opinion, life imprisonment is only established for adults. 140. First, the Court finds it relevant to reiterate that the term “child” is understood to mean any person who has not yet attained 18 years of age, unless the applicable domestic law stipulates a different age of majority (supra para. 67). Moreover, children have the same rights as all human beings, and also have “special rights derived from their condition 48