256. It is evident from the above that the appeals in cassation filed in favor of Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal, 332 Ricardo David Videla Fernández, 333 César Alberto Mendoza, 334 Claudio David Núñez and Lucas Matías Mendoza 335 were rejected, basically, on the grounds that what was sought was a review of issues related to the facts and the evidence, including the questioning of the sentence to life imprisonment, which were beyond the scope of the appeal for review established in Article 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the province of Mendoza, and Article 456 of the national Code of Criminal Procedure. Based on rigid formulas contrary to the integral review of the judgment in the sense required by the Convention, the rejection of the appeals in cassation was in limine, without any examination of the merits of the matter, and without considering that issues relating to the facts and evidence could also have an impact on the rectification of a criminal conviction (supra para. 253). In terms of case law on the scope of the right to appeal the judgment, the decisions rendered on the appeals in cassation were contrary to the provisions of Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention. 332 On April 3, 2002, the official Public Defender filed an remedy of cassation against the conviction, which was rejected on August 5, 2002, by the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza (supra para. 87). Among other elements, the Chamber indicated that: “[t]he procedural sphere of the remedy of cassation] is limited to matters of law; in other words, it is only concerned with the examination of the juridical accuracy of the judgment, in both its formal and substantive aspects. Consequently, matters relating to the determination of the factual circumstances and the assessment of the evidence fall outside its sphere, with the exception of presumptions of arbitrariness.” Cf. Decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza of August 5, 2002 in case No. 73,771 (file of annexes to the pleadings and motions brief, tome XIII, folios 7007 to 7008). 333 On December 19, 2002, the defense counsel of Ricardo David Videla Fernández filed appeals in cassation for six of the joindered cases for which he had been sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza reject these appeals on April 24, 2003 (supra para. 91). In this regard, it stated, inter alia, that: “[r]egarding the failure to provide the grounds for the sentence, [… t]his way of contesting the judgment denatures the remedy of cassation, by seeking an examination ex novo of the case, which means that it is formally unviable, owing to the exceptional and restrictive nature of this special stage. […] Regarding the alleged substantive error, this must also be rejected; […t]his way of submitting the problem leads to its formal unfeasibility, because the contestation does not respect the facts that were considered to be true, and these represent an unavoidable limit to cassation, because the task of control of legality assigned to this court, supposes respect for the facts established in the dictum.” Cf. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the province of Mendoza of April 24, 2003, in case No. 76,063 (file of annexes to the submission of the case, tome IX, folios 5080 and 5082). 334 On November 16, 1999, the Official Public Defender of the case filed an appeal in cassation against the judgment convicting César Alberto Mendoza. On November 30, 1999, the Juvenile Oral Court rejected the appeal (supra para. 79) considering, among other matters, that “[cassation] is a way of contesting the judgment to rectify a legal error in the judgment […]. […] The National Criminal Cassation Chamber (Second Chamber) has decided […] that ‘the assessments made by the judges […] to graduate the punishment to impose are […] excluded from control by cassation’ […]. Consequently, we understand that the appeal in cassation filed […] must be rejected.” Cf. Ruling of Juvenile Oral Court No. 1 of November 30, 1999, in case No. 1,084 (file of annexes to the submission of the case, tome VIII, folios 4453 to 4454). Against this ruling, the official Public Defender of the case filed a remedy of complaint owing to the rejection of the appeal in cassation. This remedy was rejected by the Second Chamber of the National Criminal Cassation Chamber in a ruling of June 23, 2000 (supra para. 80), in which it considered, inter alia, that: “the rules that govern the individualization of the punishment are reserved for application by the judges of the merits and, in principle, are beyond the control of cassation […].” Cf. Decision of the Second Chamber of the National Criminal Cassation Chamber of June 23, 2000, in case No. 2544 (file of annexes to the submission of the case, tome VIII, folio 4470). 335 Three appeals in cassation were filed against the judgment convicting Claudio David Núñez and Lucas Matías Mendoza. On May 6, 1999, the Juvenile Oral Court ruled in this regard, rejecting the appeals (supra para. 83). Among other considerations, that court indicated that: “[a]ll matters relating to the assessment of the evidence are reserved to the trial court and fall outside the remedy of cassation, as is the method chosen by the court to make its analysis […]. […T]he Criminal Cassation Chamber has indicated that the criteria for graduating the punishment are reserved to the court hearing the merits, which ‘is, in principle, sovereign as regards the graduation of the punishment to be imposed’ […]. [… M]atters relating to the facts and the assessment of the evidence fall outside the sphere of the remedy in question.” Cf. Decision of Juvenile Oral Court No. 1 of May 6, 1999 (file of annexes to the submission of the case, tome VIII, folios 4728 to 4730). 84