argued that the right to personal notification had been recognized by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic. Regarding César Alberto Mendoza, she argued that “the exercise of his right to obtain a review of the decision that rejected his special appeal before the Supreme Court of Justice was thwarted [… because] his defense lawyer […] not only failed to file the corresponding remedy of complaint, but also failed to inform him of the existence of this remedy.” Similarly, nor did Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal “have the opportunity to exhaust all the available remedies, [… because] his defense lawyer, in addition to unilaterally waiving [… the right to file the remedy of complaint,] failed to inform his client about the procedural mechanisms available to him to reverse the decision that sentenced him to life imprisonment.” Therefore, the representative asked the Court to declare that Argentina had violated the rights protected by Articles 1(1), 8(2)(d) and (e), and 19 of the American Convention, in light of Article 40(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to the detriment of César Alberto Mendoza and Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal. The representative did not submit arguments concerning Claudio David Núñez and Lucas Matías Mendoza. 264. The State did not submit any arguments in this regard. D.2. Considerations of the Court 265. Both the Commission and the representative argued that Cesar Alberto Mendoza and Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal were not notified personally of decisions regarding which they could have filed appeals, thereby violating their right to a defense. The representative also indicated that in the domestic sphere, the right to personal notification of the interested party could be inferred from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Argentine Republic of September 21, 2004, considering that “the possibility to obtain a new judicial ruling […] constitutes an faculty of the accused and not a technical possibility for the defense counsel.” 340 266. The Court finds it pertinent to indicate that neither the parties nor the InterAmerican Commission provided the complete judicial files relating to the appeals filed by César Alberto Mendoza and Saúl Cristian Roldán Cajal. However, in the file of the case before this Court, there is no evidence that they were notified personally of the decision handed down on the special appeals filed by their defense counsel. 267. In this regard, subparagraphs (d) and (e) of Article 8(2) of the American Convention establishes the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing or by counsel provided by the State if the accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law. This provision does not expressly indicate that, having legal counsel, all decisions made on the appeals filed by the latter must also be notified personally to the accused. In this regard, the representative argued that this right could be inferred from a ruling of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (supra para. 263). However, neither the Commission nor the representative explained how the 2004 ruling, which is therefore subsequent to the facts analyzed, could be taken into consideration by this Court to decide the matter raised. Therefore, the Court does not have any evidence to rule on the supposed violation of the rights recognized in Article 8(2)(d) and (e), in relation to Articles 1(1) and 19 of the 340 Cf. Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, “Dubra, David et al.,” judgment of September 21, 2004, para. 3 (file of annexes to the submission of the case, tome VII, folio 4410). This judgment indicates that: “what must be taken into account in order to calculate the time for filing the complaint is the personal notification of the accused of the decision that makes the conviction final – because the possibility of obtaining a new judicial ruling through the procedural remedies is a privilege of the accused and not a technical possibility for the defense counsel – and the eventual obtaining of evidence that guarantee fully the right to defense […].” 87