indicated that “at no time prior to the [Merits report] did the Commission inform the State that the petitioners had argued the exceptions established in Articles 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the Convention, so that this is a new argument in the proceedings.” Lastly, in its final written arguments, the State indicated that, in their observations on the preliminary objections, the Commission and the representatives “recognized expressly that the State had indicated at the appropriate procedural moment that the effective remedy available was the application for amparo.” 27. The State concluded that it had not tacitly waived the filing of the preliminary objection, and “that the Commission failed to observe its own rules of procedure when it admitted the petition lodged in this case, without evaluating [with due rigor, whether the representatives of the [presumed] victims had filed and also exhausted the domestic remedies.” 28. The Commission observed that the Dominican Republic was referring to a brief presented to this Court in a proceeding other than the processing of the contentious case, and that “the fact that, in a communication to the Court, it had indicated in general terms that the issues raised by the State corresponded to the analysis of the contentious case did not exempt the State from presenting the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies expressly before the Commission, accompanied by the necessary information.” During the public hearing it added that “[t]he State […] merely cited the existence of the remedy of amparo without specifying how it could have been filed by the victims who had actually been deported in the circumstances described.” 29. The representatives stated that, in the said brief of August 8, 2000, the State “did not indicate the appropriate remedy that allegedly had not been exhausted, nor did it mention whether it was available, suitable and effective”; hence, the argument was not made appropriately and, in any case, that brief had been presented “in a different proceeding to this one and, therefore, the argument should not be taken into account.” They added that “the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies contained in Article 46(2)(b) of the Convention […] is applicable to this case, because the [presumed] victims were formally and physically prevented from access to the remedies under domestic law,” as they had been expelled or deported without a court order, so that there was no judicial decision that they could contest and, added to this, outside Dominican territory they did not have access to an effective remedy. A.2. Considerations of the Court 30. Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention establishes that, for a petition or communication lodged before the Commission to be admissible, it is necessary that “the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.” This rule was conceived in the interests of the State to allow it to resolve the dispute in the domestic sphere before being faced with international proceedings. 27 This means that not only must these remedies exist formally, but they must also be adequate and effective, 28 as a result of the exceptions established in Article 27 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61; Case of Mejía Idrovo v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 5, 2011. Series C No. 228, para. 27, and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 19, 2014. Series C No. 277, para. 15. 28 This means, on the one hand, that the function of the remedy in question, “within the domestic legal system, must be appropriate to protect the juridical situation infringed. Numerous remedies exist under every domestic legal system, but they are not all applicable in every circumstance. If, in a specific case, the remedy is not appropriate, it is evident that it is not necessary to exhaust it.” “Furthermore, a remedy must be effective; in other words, it must be able to produce the result for which it was conceived.” Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. 14