describe or examine the respective arguments when analyzing the alleged violation of the right to movement and residence (infra paras. 384 to 389). 229. Having made these clarifications, the Court will now describe the arguments of the Commission and of the parties, and then set out the considerations of the Court in this regard. B) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 230. The Commission, referring to Willian Medina Ferreras and Rafaelito Pérez Charles, as well as to the children at the time: Awilda Medina, Luis Ney Medina and Carolina Isabel Medina, Miguel Jean, Victoria Jean and Natalie Jean, argued that, according to the statements of the presumed victims and the documentation provided by the State, they were Dominican nationals and possessed the pertinent documentation to prove this. However, during their arbitrary detention and expulsion, they were not given the opportunity to present this documentation or it was destroyed by Dominican officials, and this resulted in the presumed victims being unable to prove their physical existence and juridical personality. The Commission alleged that “these practices” placed the victims in a situation of extreme risk, depriving them of the enjoyment and exercise of their rights, and signified de facto that the victims were arbitrarily deprived of the recognition and enjoyment of their nationality. 231. The Commission argued that, according to the evidence provided, Dominican officials “refused” to register Victor Jean as a citizen of the Dominican Republic, which resulted in his “exclusion from the State’s legal and institutional order, refusing to recognize his very existence as a subject […] of law.” 232. The Commission also “recall[ed] the Court’s finding” that “a person’s migratory status is not transmitted to his children,” 276 and added that, in any case, the exception to ius soli currently included in Dominican law, consisting in the “legal status of the parents,” is not applicable to any of the presumed victims born in Dominican territory, because this exception was introduced in 2004 and constitutionalized in 2010. The Commission considered that, despite the fact that the State observes the principle of ius soli, the impediments that exist to granting nationality to persons born in the Dominican Republic constitute an arbitrary deprivation of nationality which contributes to the detention and possible deportation of Dominican nationals. 233. Consequently, it inferred that “based on the established context, and the laws and practices of the Dominican State at the time of the events, Haitian migrants had to contend with a number of obstacles that prevented them from legalizing their status in the country and registering their children born in Dominican territory.” In addition, it noted that the State’s laws and practices that led to the deprivation of nationality owing to the failure to register Dominicans of Haitian descent constituted a generalized practice specifically aimed at persons of Haitian descent and those with the darkest skin color. It considered that, although it was true that Dominican laws do not expressly establish provisions that prejudice Haitians and those of Haitian descent, “it is no less true that their interpretation and application reveal their discriminatory impact on this population.” 234. “[T]he Commission […] consider[ed] that the obstacles that exist in the Dominican Republic to registering children of Haitian descent had been proved” and recalled the Court’s observation in paragraph 109 of its judgment in the Case of the Yean and Bosico 276 The Commission referred to the judgment of the Court in the case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, also indicating other aspects of that decision included in its paragraph 157. 77