the State has indicated, the State’s “authority” concerning the regulation of nationality is limited by respect for human rights; in particular, by the obligation to avoid the risk of statelessness (supra para. 245). Expert witness Harrington made a similar observation. 340 293. However, the State alleged that, in its opinion, the presumed victims referred to above (supra para. 277) “were not born Dominicans based on the application of the principle of ius soli […], because neither they nor their parents have proved that […] their migratory status was regular at the time of their birth.” In addition, the State indicated that these persons would not be stateless, because Haiti recognized ius sanguinis and asserted that the establishment of requirements for acquiring nationality is not discriminatory and that there was no evidence of “institutional discrimination” against “Haitians who seek to obtain Dominican nationality” (supra para. 247). 341 The State’s argument is consistent with the affirmation of the Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court in 2005 and 2013, respectively, understanding that, despite the absence of an explicit reference in the constitutional texts prior to the constitutional amendment published on January 26, 2010, based on the domestic constitutional and juridical regime in force prior to that year, those whose parents were aliens in an irregular situation do not have a right to acquire Dominican nationality. 294. In this regard, the Court finds it desirable to indicate that, irrespective of the legal terms of State laws and regulations, or their interpretation by the competent State organs, as indicated by this Court in the Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, basic standards of reasonableness must be followed in matters relating to the rights and obligations established in the American Convention. Thus, as the InterAmerican Court indicated in that case, “to consider a person as a transient or in transit, irrespective of the classification used, the State must respect a reasonable time frame, and be coherent with the fact that an alien who develops ties in a State cannot be compared to a transient or to a person in transit.” 342 295. Moreover, the Court notes that, prior to the entry into force of the 2010 constitutional amendment or, at least before the enactment of the 2004 Migration Law, there was no consistent State practice or uniform judicial interpretation that denied nationality to the children of aliens in an irregular situation. Thus, it is illustrative to note the previously cited domestic judicial decision of October 16, 2003, that “the illegal status of the alien cannot be compared to the concept of ‘in transit,’” (supra para. 281). Expert witness Rodríguez Gómez, in his expert opinion provided by affidavit on October 1, 2013, stated that, until the enactment of the Migration Law, “national case law […] was consistent and categorical on this issue” in the sense of the said judicial decision. Furthermore, the “Consideranda” of Law No. 169-14 (supra para. 180 and infra paras. 320 to 324) are also illustrative when noting, based on findings of the Constitutional Court in 340 The expert witness added that, in addition to the deprivation of nationality on discriminatory grounds, and in case statelessness was caused, the deprivation of nationality without due process of law was also arbitrary. She indicated that the “deprivation of nationality” which is prohibited under international law, when it is arbitrary, “covers [both] situations in which persons who have previously been recognized as citizens of a State are subsequently deprived of the recognition of that nationality, [and] cases of persons who have a right to the nationality of a specific State based on a first reading of the domestic laws, but who cannot obtain recognition of that nationality as a result of local practices and customs or other aspects of the recognition process” (expert opinion of Julia Harrington provided by affidavit on October 1, 2013; file of preliminary objections, merits and reparations, fs. 1778 to 1733). 341 Regarding the State’s argument, it should be noted that there is no dispute between the parties that the presumed victims mentioned here are of Haitian descent, and this has not been contested by the Commission either. In particular, it should be stressed that the State has indicated that they are all “of Haitian origin” (supra para. 247). 342 Case of the Yean and Bosico Girls v. Dominican Republic, para. 157. 95