21 responsible for the acts and omissions of its agents acting in their official capacity, even when those agents act outside the scope of their authority.30 68. The international responsibility of the State results from “the acts or omissions of any of its bodies or agencies, regardless of their authority, which are in violation of the InterAmerican Convention.”31 For the purpose of establishing that a violation of the rights enshrined in the Convention has been committed, it is not required, as it is under domestic criminal law, that the perpetrators’ liability or intent be established. Nor is it required that the agents to whom such violations are attributed be identified individually.32 Rather, it is sufficient to prove that public officials have provided support to or shown tolerance for the violation of rights enshrined by the Convention,33 that their omissions have enabled the commission of such violations, or that the State has failed to comply with any of its duties.34 * * * 69. The parties have raised several matters in controversy regarding the determination of State international responsibility for the events in the instant case. 70. Regarding the events described in the instant case, the State asserted that it has only acknowledged its responsibility for “the facts which specifically relate to the ‘The Rochela’ massacre, whereby it “categorically rejects any findings about the ‘context’ [which] might suggest that ‘paramilitarism’ was a product of a generalized policy of the Colombian State”. As consequence, the State rejected all evidence that support the allusion of this context (supra para. 31). Therefore, the State argued that its recognition of responsibility refers only to “isolated acts” committed by various state agents; “it has been proven that there was not institutional relationship or dependence between the groups which operated illegally and various state agents”; and “no official duties were delegated to private individuals”. Furthermore, Colombia pointed out that “it can no longer be charged with” the creation of “a special (but legally tolerable) risk situation” derived from the fact that it issued Decree 3398 of 1965 and Law 48 of 1968, the legal instruments which allowed the creation of self-defense groups, as it has adopted “measures […] tending to mitigate the negative consequences of their particularly dangerous activities”. 71. For its part, the Commission argued that the massacre “did not vacuum,” but “as consequence of a series of actions and omissions that before and in a determined social and normative context.” Furthermore, pointed out that the creation of paramilitary groups was promoted by take place in a took place days the Commission the State as a 30 Cf. Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 12, para. 111; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre, supra note 12, para. 108; and Case of the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers. Judgment of July 8, 2004. Series C No. 110, para. 72. 31 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison, supra note 8, para. 31; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 12, para. 112; and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre, supra note 12, para. 110. 32 Cf. Case of La Cantuta, supra note 8, para. 156; Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 12, para. 112; and Case of the Mapiripán Massacre, supra note 12, para. 110. 33 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 141. In the same sense, cf. Case of Cantos. Judgment of November 28, 2002. Series C No. 97, para. 28; and Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, para. 66. 34 Cf. Case of Pueblo Bello Massacre, supra note 12, para. 112; Case of the Mapiripán Massacre, supra note 12, para. 110; and Case of the 19 Tradesmen, supra note 33, para. 141.