107. The Court recalls that, by virtue of the obligation not to discriminate, States are required to adopt positive measures to reverse or change existing discriminatory situations in their societies that prejudice a certain group of people. This entails a special duty of protection on the part of the State with regard to the actions and practices of third parties who, with its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain or facilitate discriminatory situations. 135 As noted by the expert witness Laura Clérico, the State’s obligation “is two-fold” given that “not only must it not perpetuate inequality, but it must also repair the harm caused and transform the factors that generate it so that it does not continue to occur.” 136 This means that, without a rigorous review by national authorities of allegations of discrimination caused by a private company, it will be difficult or impossible for the State to comply with this special duty of protection. 108. The Court has indicated that with regard to the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, protected by Article 1(1) of the Convention, the possible restriction of a right requires a rigorous and weighty justification, and the burden of proof is reversed, which means that it is up to the authority to demonstrate that its decision did not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. 137 Indeed, the Court has accepted that because victims of discrimination do not control the evidence or the means to clarify prima facie acts of discrimination, the American Convention requires the reversal of the burden of proof to ensure the effectiveness of the principle of equality and nondiscrimination. For example, in the case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, the Court stated the following: In this regard, the Court acknowledges the difficulty for those who are the object of discrimination to prove racial prejudice, so it agrees with the European Court that, in certain cases of human rights violations motivated by discrimination, the burden of proof falls on the State, which controls the means to clarify incidents that took place on its territory. 138 109. In the case of allegations of discrimination due to the acts of third parties, such as those occurring within the framework of a commercial relationship between a business and a consumer, this standard applies in a similar manner, with the administrative and/or judicial authorities being responsible for overseeing the actions of businesses in the context of their labor and commercial relations in accordance with inter-American and international standards. On this point, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has pointed out that when companies are involved in human rights violations, there are often barriers and “burdens of proof” that make it difficult to prove such violations before the State. The Committee has also pointed out that the means of 135 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-24/17, supra, paras. 91, 96, 101 and 104, and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 37. 136 Cf. Written version of the expert opinion of Laura Clérico rendered at the public hearing on August 24, 2022, in the context of the Court’s 150th Regular Session, para. 23 (evidence file, folio 6029). 137 Cf. Case of Gonzales Lluy et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2015. Series C No. 298, para. 257, and Case of Guevara Díaz v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 49. 138 Cf. Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 24, 2012. Series C No. 251, para. 229. 36