25 76. Furthermore, according to domestic law and the information provided by the State, proceedings could possibly be initiated against Mr. Neptune before the High Court of Justice, following which, according to Article 189(2) of the Constitution, it is possible that criminal or civil proceedings could eventually be filed or continue against him. When delivering this judgment, there is no evidence that any procedure of that nature has been initiated against him. Moreover, at this time, the conditions do not appear to exist which would ensure that this procedure could be constituted, or that it could serve as an effective remedy (supra para. 69). Even if the constitutional provisions relating to the High Court of Justice could not serve interests contrary to justice as regards grave human rights violations, neither can invoking them lead to the continuation of situations of arbitrariness. Although the Court will not assess whether Mr. Neptune should appear before this procedure in future, these constitutional provisions must be taken into account as procedural guarantees to which Mr. Neptune has not had access. In conclusion, his actual juridical situation is one of absolute juridical uncertainty. b) The right of access to justice and the right to be heard within a reasonable time by a competent judge 77. The Court has stated that, under the American Convention, the States Parties are obliged to provide effective judicial recourses to those who allege that they are victims of human rights violations (Article 25), recourses that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules of due process of law (Article 8(1)), all within the general obligation of these States to ensure the free and full exercise of the rights established by the Convention to all persons subject to their jurisdiction (Article 1(1)). 107 It is evident that the mere formal existence of the recourse is insufficient; it must also be effective, that is, it must provide results or a response to the violations of the rights established in the Convention.108 78. Mr. Neptune’s situation of juridical uncertainty has been established (supra paras. 75 and 76), confirmed, in particular, by the scope of the decision of the Gonaïves Court of Appeal: in principle, the organs of the administration of ordinary justice were not competent to investigate him without a prior determination of responsibility in a political trial before the High Court of Justice. In other words, Mr. Neptune was prosecuted and kept in prison for more than two years by order of a court that was not legally competent. 79. Article 8 of the Convention, which refers to the right to a fair trial, establishes the guidelines of the so-called “due process,” which consist inter alia in the right of every person to be heard, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial judge or court, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against him.109 107 Cf. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 91; Case of Zambrano Vélez et al., supra note 47, para. 114, and La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 43, para. 145. 108 Cf. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra note 34, paras. 63-64 and 66-68; Case of the Saramaka People, supra note 36, para. 177, and Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 36, para. 133. See also, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of October 6, 1987. Series A No. 9, para. 24.. 109 Cf. Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 29, 1997, Series C No. 30, para. 74, and Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panamá, supra note 39, para. 137.