PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION JUDGE AD HOC DIEGO RODRÍGUEZ PINZON IN THE CASE OF SALVADOR CHIRIBOGA V. ECUADOR JUDGMENT OF MAY 6, 2008 1. I agree with the decision delivered by the Court in this case, except for the violation of Article 25 of the Convention. I must say that my partially dissenting opinion is the result of a debate that, in my opinion, is of great importance as to the protection of human rights in América and to which several well-known jurists of this part of the world has referred by adopting different positions regarding the scope of Article 8 and Article 25. 2. I consider that the proven facts in the instant case do not evidence that the right to judicial protection as embodied in such provision has been violated. In this sense, I must point out that the victim of the violations of Article 8 and 21 in relation to Article 1(1) had access to broad judicial recourses that, I consider, comply with the terms provided for in Article 25(1), based on the following arguments: 3. The victim could filed two (2) subjective remedies with the civil courts in order to object to the declaration of public use of the property. Said remedies, in accordance with the evidence furnished, can be solved within a term of 27 to 37 days1 pursuant to the corresponding legislation. Furthermore, said proceedings have the necessary legal virtuality that would allow the corresponding court delivering binding judicial decisions. Moreover, there is the presumption that such are competent courts, in accordance with the alleged and proven facts of the proceedings. 4. Besides, the victim had access to the writ of constitutional amparo which the Court on Constitutional matters solved against her (in a month a half, approximately) after the decision delivered by the District Court was appealed (proceeding that lasted 5 months, approximately, including the objection filed by the plaintiff on the ground of the initial declination of jurisdiction of the District Court which was admitted by the Court on Constitutional matters) without any questioning the competence of the courts. I consider that said recourse has also the necessary legal virtuality so that the court on duty can deliver judicial decisions protecting the corresponding right, even though such court had found against the victim in this case. 5. Likewise, the victim had the opportunity to actively participate in the proceeding for condemnation, which, in turn, has also been brought before courts that are presumed to be competent in accordance with the arguments and proven facts. This procedure can be solved in approximately 38 days (and some more days when “adding the terms derived from other circumstances of the proceeding”)2 pursuant to the Ecuadorian legislation and it has the sufficient legal virtuality to protect the right in question. 6. Moreover, I must say that the Court established that the relevant rules in this case are in keeping with the American Convention and therefore, there is no violation of Article 2 of such treaty. This includes the procedural rules related to the legal remedies filed by the victim and the State. 1 2 See para. 82. See para. 105.