16 defenses to a charge of murder.36 These defenses seek to escape a conviction for murder and replace it with one for manslaughter, for example, which carries a sentence of life imprisonment, or even to totally exclude criminal liability for murder.37 Nevertheless, if and when a defendant is found guilty of the crime of murder, the law does not allow the judge any latitude to consider the degree of culpability of the defendant or other forms of punishment that may be better suited for that particular person in light of all circumstances. That is, courts have no authority to individualize the sentence in conformity with information on the offense and the offender. 56. On the other hand, the Court has previously considered that in analyzing the mandatory death penalty system in Barbados, a distinction must also be made between the right under Article 4(6) of the Convention of every convicted person to “apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence,” and the right recognized in Article 4(2) to have a “competent court” determine whether the death penalty is the appropriate sentence in each case, in accordance with domestic law and the American Convention. In that regard, the Court has held that sentencing is a judicial function. Although the executive branch may well grant pardon or commutation of a sentence already imposed, the judicial branch may not be stripped away of its responsibility to impose the appropriate sentence for a particular crime. In the present case, the judicial branch had no other option than to sentence the alleged victim to death when he was found guilty of murder, and no judicial review of the punishment of death was allowed because it is a punishment specifically fixed by law.38 57. In sum, regardless of the available defenses for the determination of a murder conviction, and despite the possibility to apply to the executive branch for a commutation of a death sentence, the Court considers that in the determination of punishment, Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act mechanically and generically imposes the death penalty on all persons found guilty of murder. This, as the Tribunal has previously held,39 is in contravention of the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life recognized in Article 4(1) of the Convention, as it fails to individualize the sentence in conformity with the characteristics of the crime, as well as the participation and degree of culpability of the accused. * * * 36 Cf. Offenses Against the Person Act 1994, (defining, for example, diminished responsibility and provocation), ss. 4 and 5, (case file of appendices to the application, volume I, appendix A.4, folios 120 and 121). 37 Cf. Offenses Against the Person Act 1994, supra note 36, s. 6, (case file of appendices to the application, volume I, appendix A.4, folio 122). 38 Cf. Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 60. After a murder conviction, an appeal against conviction can be pursued to the Court of Appeal of Barbados, and following that, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Since 2005, the Caribbean Court of Justice replaced the latter. Grounds for appeal to the Court of Appeals are based on questions of law, fact, mixed law and fact, or any other grounds sufficient for appeal, and in mandatory death penalty cases, it is an appeal against the conviction, not the death sentence, which is specifically fixed and mandated by law. Grounds for appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were based on questions of law, interpretation of the Constitution, general or public importance, and mixed law and fact. Cf. Criminal Appeal Act, Ch. 113A (Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados case file of appendices to the final written submissions presented by all parties, folios 6867 and 6887). Grounds for appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice on criminal proceedings are mainly based on the interpretation of the Constitution. Cf. Caribbean Court of Justice Act, Ch. 117 (Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados case file of appendices to the final written submissions presented by all parties, folios 6903-6904). 39 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al., supra note 22, para. 108; Case of Boyce et al., supra note 20, para. 61, and Case of Raxcacó-Reyes, supra note 22, paras. 81-82.