27 submitted before the jury the issue of the effect that alcohol and drugs may have had on the accused´s mental state. Third, considering that Mr. DaCosta Cadogan was afforded state-appointed legal counsel, the presiding judge had the duty to adopt a more active role in ensuring that all necessary measures were carried out in order to guarantee a fair trial. Fourth, Mr. DaCosta Cadogan requested during his appeal process that he be allowed the opportunity to submit a more detailed evaluation of his alleged personality disorder and alcohol dependence, which was denied. 90. Therefore, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and the strict procedural requirements that the State was obliged to observe due to the possibility of a mandatory imposition of a death sentence, the Tribunal considers that the State’s omission referred to above constituted a violation of Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s right to a fair trial recognized under Article 8(1), 8(2)(c), and 8(2)(f) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof. * * * 91. Finally, the representatives contended that the State had provided Mr. DaCosta Cadogan, who was indigent, with incompetent counsel, in violation of his rights under Article 8(2)(e) of the Convention. They argued that the “failure of [the alleged victim’s] trial attorney to request an independent forensic psychiatric or psychological assessment was grossly incompetent, [since] the question as to whether a defen[s]e of diminished responsibility might be available [was] critical and [should have been] considered by any competent defen[s]e counsel. […] However, [trial counsel gave] no account as to why, having recognized the potential [effects] of excessive liquor and drugs [on Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s state of mind], he took no steps to have the alleged victim medically assessed in that regard.” 92. The State asserted that the Caribbean Court of Justice “addresse[d]” and “firmly dismiss[ed]” contentions regarding the ineffectiveness of Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s trial attorney, expressly noting that he was represented by a very experienced counsel, and that therefore this Tribunal was barred from reviewing this issue. 93. The Court considers that there were a number of available defenses that the stateappointed defense counsel could have pursued at trial. However, his failure to pursue a defense of diminished responsibility and his decision to choose instead other available defenses certainly did not amount to gross incompetence. Consequently, the Court considers that the failure of the state-appointed counsel to request an independent psychiatric or psychological assessment in this case does not amount to a violation of Mr. DaCosta Cadogan’s right to a fair trial. Therefore, the State is not responsible for a violation of Article 8(2)(e) of the Convention with regard to the issue of incompetency of counsel. IX REPARATIONS (APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 63(1) OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION)80 80 Article 63(1) establishes that: “[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.”