5 15. The Commission “consider[ed] that this objection to the admissibility of the case should be deemed inadmissible because it [had] already decided in [Admissibility] Report No. 7/08 of March 4th, 2008, that Barbados had ‘not provided observations regarding the admissibility of Mr. Cadogan’s claims [during the procedural opportunity provided for that purpose], and [had] thereby tacitly waived its right to object to the admissibility of claims in the petition based on the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement. The information before the Commission indicates that [Mr. Cadogan] in fact exhausted the ordinary remedies applicable in this case.’” Further, the Commission observed that the letters referred to by the State in its response (supra para. 14) are dated July 4 and July 9, 2008, whereas the Admissibility Report was issued on March 4, 2008, and “[t]he State was given ample opportunity by the Commission to contest the admissibility of the petition, from its transmission to the State [on] January 23, 2007.” “Accordingly, the State waived its right to object to the admissibility of this case at the permissible stage, and it should be barred by the well established doctrine of estoppel from availing itself of this defense at a later stage in the proceedings.” 16. The representatives argued that in accordance with the doctrine of estoppel and Articles 37 and 46 of the American Convention, “th[e] Court has consistently held that a State may not seek to challenge the admissibility of an application on grounds of nonexhaustion of domestic remedies in circumstances where it had every opportunity to raise such objection before the Commission, but failed to do so in a timely fashion; [o]r alternatively[, that t]here are no effective domestic remedies which remain to be exhausted.” The representatives added that “[i]n the present case, the State of Barbados first raised the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies in its [r]esponse dated 9th July 2008. This was not done in the time allotted by the Commission, [which was] two months from […] 23 January 2007, the date the request was transmitted. Thus, the Commission concluded in [its Merits Report No. 60/08 that]: ‘[t]he State did not provide observations regarding admissibility of Mr[.] Cadogan’s claims in the time allotted. […] Given that the State did not respond within this timeframe, the State thereby tacitly waived its right to object to the admissibility of claims in the petition based on the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement.’” 17. On the other hand, the representatives submitted that “[i]n his petition before the Caribbean Court of Justice for leave to appeal, the alleged victim argued[,] inter alia, that his constitutional right to a fair hearing was infringed because i) he was not given and/or was deprived of the assistance [of a] psychiatric expert; ii) he did not have and/or was deprived of the effective assistance of an [a]ttorney[…], and iii) his [a]ttorney[…] was incompetent. [P]articularly, he submitted that ‘because of a lack of legal aid he was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence as to whether he was suffering from mental illness.’ Moreover, the alleged victim applied to the CCJ to adduce further evidence from a psychiatrist concerning the alleged victim’s mental health to supplement what was admitted to be the unsatisfactory Report of Dr[.] Mahy or at least that the appeal be stayed so as to permit the alleged victim the opportunity to be further examined by a psychiatric expert.” “The [Caribbean Court of Justice] denied the alleged victim leave to appeal against conviction and therefore rejected his constitutional complaints.” In any case, the representatives further submitted “that legal aid for a constitutional challenge is only available for applications to the High Court and appeals to the Court of Appeal.” Thus, “[l]egal [a]id [was] not available for any appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice when the alleged victim’s appeals were extant.”