proportionality test, but conformed to a legalistic analysis of the situation. Thus, the representatives alleged that article 2(1) of the Guatemalan Notarial Code was neither proportionate nor reasonable when requiring the person concerned to be a national or obliging that person to take Guatemalan citizenship in order to be a notary, because less harmful measures existed. 46. The representatives argued that, even though the restriction of the exercise of the notarial profession was established by law, it did not comply with the other elements of the proportionality test. They pointed out that Guatemala had indicated that the objective of this restriction was accountability and the protection of national sovereignty, and also as a mechanism to ensure the correct use of the legal authority to attest documents. In this regard, they argued that: (a) discrimination based on nationality was prohibited and clearly violated international obligations; (b) sovereignty could not be argued as a legitimate objective to run counter to the principle of equality and non-discrimination recognized as a jus cogens norm; (c) even if it were accepted as a legitimate objective, the measure was not necessary because, in Guatemala, notaries were not public officials and did not represent the interests of the State; rather, they possessed a function of the authentication of documents that involved the consent of third parties; (d) even if it were accepted that the notary performed a public function, there were less harmful ways of protecting the function, such as the accreditation procedures established in article 1 of the Guatemalan Notarial Code with which Mr. Hendrix had complied; (e) the notarial function was a technical function, and although it was a public function it was not a direct consequence of popular sovereignty, and (f) Guatemala had an accountability system that ensured that notarial functions were performed in keeping with the interests of the State to safeguard legal certainty. 47. The representatives also presented arguments on the need for rootedness in the country, and the guarantee of legal security and certainty in order to prove that neither do these pass the proportionality test. In addition, regarding a comparison between the Anglo-Saxon notarial system and the Latin notarial system, they underscored that the difference between the two systems was not the purpose of this international dispute and that, irrespective of the system, international human rights law did not allow discrimination based on nationality. 48. The State alleged that the requirement of legality had been met and that the analysis should not focus only on article 2(1) of the Notarial Code, but also on articles 4 and 146 of the Constitution. It argued that the State’s position at the domestic level was based on the law and that the authorities acted in accordance with their legal powers and not arbitrarily. Regarding the objective of the restriction, it pointed out that the purpose of article 2(1) of the Notarial Code was to protect the sovereignty derived from the attestation authority, and to reinforce legal certainty and the protection of human rights both of which were guaranteed owing to the intervention of the notary. It asserted that, in Guatemala, notaries were vested with attestation authority delegated by the State – based on its sovereignty – and by law, in exercise of which they certified and authenticated documents, acts, contracts and other legal affairs. It added that, in exercise of this attestation authority the notary acted in the name of the State, and exercised a public function. 49. With regard to the suitability of the measure, it argued that this exists because Guatemalan notaries were invested with “attestation authority” which meant that they were able to establish an objective truth, with erga omnes effects. In addition, they received, interpreted and gave legal form to the intention of the parties in order to adjust this to the country’s legal requirements. As a result of this “attestation authority” the relationship between notaries and the general public was not circumscribed to a merely private sphere, but encompassed public elements because they exercised a public function of general interest. It indicated that Guatemala had adopted an eclectic theory under which notaries were responsible for a public function which they exercised as a liberal profession. 14