situation to that of Guatemalan nationals who wished to be notaries. When assessing the conditions supposedly required by law to register as a notary, the Court found that, in addition to nationality, applicants were required to have “roots” in the country. This element includes, among other factors, domicile in Guatemala. The judgment then examined whether Mr. Hendrix met the requirement of rootedness based on domicile. That said, before making the analysis proposed by the Commission and by the representatives, the Court finds it necessary to determine whether Mr. Hendrix was in a similar situation to Guatemala nationals as regards the exercise of the notarial profession. Indeed, the right to equality, at least as regards equality of treatment, is based on the supposition that individuals in similar factual conditions cannot be the object of unjustified differentiated treatment. […] Consequently, it is first necessary to establish the specific situation of Mr. Hendrix in Guatemala because the alleged violation of the right to equality is based on a supposed discriminatory treatment and, in order to analyze this, it is necessary to determine whether the alleged victim was in a similar factual situation to the other persons who exercise notarial functions in Guatemala, so that it is possible to require identical treatment by the State. In this regard, it should be recalled that, in Guatemala, according to the State, in addition to other requirements, notaries are not only required to be Guatemalan nationals by birth or by naturalization, but must also prove their rootedness or attachment to the country. […] [W]hen applying for registration to exercise notarial functions, Mr. Hendrix was not resident in Guatemala. The Court notes that article 2 of the Notarial Code requires the notary to be domiciled in Guatemala. […] In other words, there was no information or evidence that allowed Mr. Hendrix’s roots in or attachment to Guatemala to be established and, according to the law, this was a necessary condition to exercise notarial public functions according to the different expert opinions presented by the State and the Commission.16 16. After providing the grounds for the conclusion that “the evidence in the case file reveals that Mr. Hendrix was in a special situation that could involve an impediment to the exercise of the notarial profession,”17 the judgment discusses the importance of the requirement of “rootedness” considering all the competences and functions performed by notaries in Guatemala.18 Based on this, it indicates that: Owing to the importance of the public functions conducted by notaries, if the notarial function is exercised improperly, there is a public interest in the State being able to implement the principle of accountability by accessing the necessary documentation to conduct the corresponding proceedings, and apply the appropriate sanctions. This therefore justifies subjecting the notarial function to permanent oversight. In Guatemala, this oversight is exercised by the professional association which, on behalf of the State, is responsible for the overall administration of the function, and its inspection and control. In this regard, the Court considers that the notary’s roots in the country are essential to guarantee the principle of accountability, because such roots involve an attachment between the person exercising the notarial profession and the country, and this makes it possible to hold such persons legally responsible for any errors in the exercise of their function.19 17. In this regard, it concludes that the requirement of rootedness in the country safeguards the possibility of attributing responsibility to notaries who exercise a function of public interest.20 It then reiterates its conclusion that “Mr. Hendrix never put down any roots in Guatemala” and “was not in a similar factual situation to the other notaries in Guatemala who, being domiciled in Guatemalan territory, had the rootedness required for 16 Cf. Judgment, paras. 67 to 70. 17 Cf. Judgment, para. 67. 18 Cf. Judgment, paras. 70 and 71. 19 Cf. Judgment, para. 73. 20 Cf. Judgment, para. 74. 4