from the provisions of the American Convention.208 105. Thus, referring specifically to the particular case at hand, the Court understands that this issue should be resolved through the direct application of the provisions of Article 23 of the American Convention, because it involves sanctions that imposed a clear restriction on one of the political rights recognized in paragraph 1 thereof, without complying with the applicable requirements in accordance with paragraph 2 thereof. 106. Article 23(1) of the Convention establishes that every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities, which must be guaranteed by the State under equal opportunity: i) to take part in public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; ii) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters; and iii) to have access to the public service of one’s country. 209 107. Article 23(2) of the Convention sets out the various causes that can restrict the rights recognized in Article 23(1) and, where applicable, the requirements that must be met for such a restriction to be applied appropriately. In this case, which is about a restriction imposed by way of a sanction, it should be about a “conviction by a competent court in criminal proceedings.” None of these requirements have been fulfilled, given that the body that imposed the sanctions was not a "competent court,” there was no "conviction," and the sanctions were not applied as a result of a "criminal proceeding,” where the judicial guarantees enshrined in Article 8 of the American Convention should have been respected. 108. The Court considers it appropriate to reiterate that “the effective exercise of political rights is an end in itself and, a fundamental means that democratic societies have to ensure that other human rights enshrined in the Convention are guaranteed 210 and that their holders, in other words, citizens, not only enjoy rights, but also "opportunities.” The latter term implies the obligation to guarantee with positive measures that anyone who holds formal political rights has a real opportunity to exercise them.211 In this case, although Mr. López Mendoza was able to exercise his political rights (supra para. 94), it is fully proven that he was deprived of passive suffrage, that is, the right to be elected. 109. Under the foregoing, the Court finds that the State violated Articles 23(1)(b) and 23(2) in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Mr. Leopoldo López Mendoza. 208 On the other hand, this Court considers that the fight against corruption is of great importance, and it will keep in mind such circumstance when in it is presented with a case wherein it has to rule on such matter. 209 Cf. Case of Yatama V. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, paras. 195 to 200, and Case of Castañeda Gutman V. México. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 6, 2008. Series C No. 184, para. 144. 210 Cf. Case of Castañeda Gutman, supra note 209, para. 143. 211 Cf. Case of Yatama, supra note 209, para. 195. 48