deems and even after years pass." They added that the Comptroller "may maintain in limbo the application of additional sanctions, thereby constituting legal uncertainty, arbitrariness, and lack of transparency." 198. The State argued that Article 105 “establishes in an express manner both the administrative infractions” as well as the “sanctions” and, moreover, provides that these be applied heeding to the makeup of the violation and the severity of the irregularity. It added that “the legality of the sanction of disqualification […] is not nor may not be subject to the fact that it is found in the same administrative act that declares the administrative responsibility,” given that “both proceedings are brought by distinct officials, to which they cannot be brought in one same and unique action” and only “proceeds after the declaration of administrative responsibility.” It added that “given that the administrative responsibilities” of Mr. López Mendoza “were declared by the Director of the Office of the Determination of Responsibility of the Comptroller General of the Republic,” the same declarative act of responsibility “could not be imposed by another official on the alleged victim the sanction of disqualification without incurring in a manifest lack of jurisdiction, since it only had a specific delegation, where the aforementioned sanction of disqualification was the exclusive power of the Comptroller General.” The State added that "given the absence of an express period for the Comptroller General [...] to impose the additional sanctions," "it has been considered appropriate" to apply "the general period of statute of limitations" identified in Article 114 of the LOCGRSNCF. 2. Considerations of the Court 199. The Court finds that under the framework of due process laid down in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, legal certainty must safeguarded regarding the period in time in which a sanction may be imposed. In this regard, the European Court has held that the law should be: i) adequately accessible, 269 ii) with sufficient precision, 270 and iii) foreseeable. 271 Under this line of thinking, the European Court used the so-called "foreseeability analysis," which takes into account three standards for determining whether a regulation is sufficiently foreseeable, namely272: i) the context of the regulation 269 “The law should be both adequately accessible and foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct. ECHR, Case Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Judgment of 26 October 2000, para. 84. Likewise, in Case of Malone v. The United Kingdom, the Court established that “[t]he law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case”. ECHR, Case Malone v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, para. 66. 270 “The law should be accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”. ECHR, Case Maestri v. Italy, Judgment of 17 February 2004, para. 30. Likewise, in Case of Malone v. The United Kingdom, the Court established that “a norm cannot be regarded as ‘law’ unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail”. ECHR, Case Malone, supra note 269, para. 66. See also, ECHR, Case Silver and others v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, para 88. 271 “[T]he Court reiterates that a rule is ‘foreseeable’ if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct”. ECHR, Case of Landvreugd v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 4 June 2002, para. 59. 272 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria (Judgment of October 26, 2000) The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable 74