-30Court considers that it is not contrary to the American Convention that a Supreme Electoral Tribunal judge can only be removed when he or she commits a crime, especially taking into account that they are elected for a period of five years. Therefore, it is unnecessary to order a legislative change in this regard. 128. However, it is contrary to the American Convention, as concluded in this case, that a judge be removed without there being a prior law that provides for this possibility. In this sense, in this Judgment it was concluded that the State has the obligation to suppress the practice through which the dismissal of TSE judges is allowed in circumstances other than those established by law (supra paras. 96 to 98). This obligation can be fulfilled through a correct application of control of conventionality. 129. This Court has indicated that all the authorities of a State Party to the Convention have the obligation to exercise a “control of conventionality” between the acts or omissions and the internal norms and the American Convention, in such a way that the interpretation and application of the national law is consistent with the State's international human rights obligations.170 This control of conventionality must be carried out within the framework of their respective competences and the corresponding procedural regulations and in this task, taking into account not only the treaty, but also the interpretation thereof made by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.171 130. To this effect, then, the interpretation made by the competent bodies as to the possibility of dismissing Supreme Electoral Tribunal judges in cases other than when they commit a crime is consistent with the principles established in this Court's case law, which have been reiterated in this case. With that understanding, this Court considers that it is not necessary to order any legislative amendment. D. Other Measures Requested 131. The Commission ordered that the State “reinstate Benjamín Eduardo Colindres to a position similar to the one he held, with the same pay, welfare benefits and rank as he would enjoy at present had he not been dismissed, for the length of time that remained under his term; or, if for justified reasons his reinstatement is not possible, pay him an alternative indemnity.” The representatives did not fully request the reinstatement of Mr. Colindres to his position as requested by the Commission. 132. In the briefs filed by the representatives, as well as in Mr. Colindres Schonenberg's statement at the public hearing, the victim did not express his desire to be reinstated to the position he held as principal judge of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Therefore, it does not consider it necessary to order the measure requested by the Commission. 133. Meanwhile, the Commission requested that the State take steps to implement the necessary legal reforms and training to ensure that disciplinary proceedings against judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, both in terms of their regulation and in practice, are conducted in conformity with the guarantees of competency, independence, and impartiality, and in strict observance of the right of defense, as well as the compatibility between applicable disciplinary grounds and penalties are with the principle of legality.” Cf. Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of December 01, 2016. Series C No. 330, para. 93. 171 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 25, and Case of Órdenes Guerra et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2018. Series C No. 372, para. 135. 170