35. In the present Judgment of Interpretation in the case of the Castro Castro Prison, the Court clarified the consultation made to it with regard to the determination of victims and the right to measures of reparation (paras. 62-70), but it did not do the same, satisfactorily, as obiter dicta, with regard to the central matter of the State’s request for interpretation. A public hearing was not held, and with this it has lost an opportunity to deal in detail with the referred matter presented to it, which today occupies a central position in the contemporary international agenda of human rights. 36. In my opinion, Article 67 of the American Convention perfectly empowers the Court to clarify the matters presented to it by all the procedural or intervening parties (the appellant State, the legal representative and common intervener of the victims, the attorneys of the “Canto Grande 92 Group” of victims, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, as well as the IDL and the CNDH). Articles 29(3) and 59 of the Rules of Procedure may also be considered the grounds for said clarification. Besides, Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure determines that the Court will decide upon the requests for interpretation through a judgment, which will include the legal substantiation (Article 55(1)(f) of the Rules of Procedure). The Convention also states that the Judgments of the Court must be substantiated. Likewise, Article 44 of the Rules of Procedures empowers the Court "in any state of the case,” to require “any measure of investigation" (evidence, report, expert opinion, information, opinion, or any other). more than two centuries before it became an independent State, celebrated peace treaties with the Dutch colonial authorities (the N'djukas in 1760), later renovated, thus obtaining their freedom from slavery (paras. 83(1) and (2)). In my Concurring Opinion in said case of the Moiwana Community, I considered that "the Maroons, - the N'djuka in particular, - regard these treaties as still valid and authoritatives in the relations with the successor State, Suriname. This means that those peoples exercised their attributes of legal persons in international law, well before the territory where they lived acquired statehood. This reinforces the thesis which I have always supported, namely, that the State are not, and have never been, the sole and exclusive subjects of international law" (para. 6). And I added: "Human beings, individually and collectively, have emerged as subjects of international law. The rights protected disclose an individual and a collective or social dimensions, but it is the human beings, members of such minorities or collectivities, who are, ultimately, the titulaires of those rights" (para. 10). As holders of rights, they can present their own arguments before a tribunal such as the InterAmerican Court with full freedom of expression (para. 12). – Actually, in a more distant past, treaties were celebrated between people and human societies with a minimum level of organization, much before the emergency of the Westphalian inter-state order in the XVII century, which proves that, both international juridical capacity, and the capacity to celebrate treaties (treaty-making power), were never an exclusive monopoly of the States. For examples (of treaties celebrated by human communities, from ancient times up to the Westphalia Peace of 1648), cf., v.g., A. Truyol and Serra, Histoire du Droit international public, Paris, Economica, 1995, pp. 5-7 and 13-14; P. Guggenheim, Traité de Droit international public, 2a. ed. rev., volume I, Genève, Georg & Cie., 1967, pp. 114-115; R. Ago, "Les premières collectivités interétatiques méditerranéennes", in Mélanges offerts à P. Reuter - Le Droit international: unité et diversité, Paris, Pedone, 1981, pp. 22-23 and 29-30. – This is additional historical information in defense of my position, held throughout the years in this Court (cf., inter alia, my Concurring Opinion in OC-16), of the humanization of International Law; cf., more recently, A.A. Cançado Trindade, A Humanização do Direito Internacional, Belo Horizonte/Brasil, Edit. Del Rey, 2006, pp. 3-409. 11