subjects of the law. Both parties – the plaintiffs and the defendant – have the right to wait for reason and persuasion of what is fair. This right has given way to a human aspiration that has been transmitted from generation to generation, throughout centuries. 41. Currently said right has been invoked in relation to the tasks of contemporary international courts. Actually, the judgment of a tribunal, - as has been stated by J.G. Merrills, - must give “cumulative reasons” that substantiate its conclusion, so that it has persuasion; this applies with even more strength in an international human rights court, whose applicable law is oriented not so much by rules, but by general principles of law.32 This is the only way in which law can be applied and at the same time developed, to obtain results in the search for the full realization of justice, which corresponds in my own point of view to the exercise of the international judicial function. 42. Studies from the past contrasted the "judicial restraint" with the "judicial legislation",33 when referring to the distance between the orthodox vision and the creative one, respectively, of the exercise of the international judicial function. I consider it more appropriate to characterize them in another way, as the judicial self-limitation, which I consider completely inadequate for an international human rights court, and the judicial impartiality, which I have defended for years within this Court, in the search for the realization of justice. These different conceptualizations have been reflected, throughout the years, in the Court’s work in matters of the Interpretation of Judgments. 43. I already referred to the extraordinary contribution, acknowledged internationally, given by the Inter-American Court to the evolution of International Human rights Law itself, through its Interpretation of the Judgment in the case of Barrios Altos (supra). There is a sensible distance between the Court’s position of judicial impartiality in the Interpretation of the Judgment in the case of Barrios Altos, which has won it the international acknowledgment of the most lucid doctrine on international law, and the restrictive predisposition that can be clearly concluded, v.g., from paragraphs 25-26 of the present Judgment of Interpretation in the case of the Castro Castro Prison.34 44. I allow myself to recall here another example of the Court’s jurisprudence. In its Interpretation of a Judgment (of 10.01.1999) in the case of Blake versus Guatemala, the Inter-American Court recalled the prevailing criterion in the international jurisprudence in this regard, according to which the interpretation of a judgment implies not only the precision of that decided by the Tribunal, but also the determination of the scope, the sense, and the purpose of the decision, pursuant to the considerations that motivated it (para. 18). . J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, 2a. ed., Manchester, University Press, 1993, pp. 31, 34-35, 177, 205, and 208-210, and cf. pp. 231-234 and 249-252. 32 . Cf., v.g., Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, London, Stevens, 1958, pp. 75-223. 33 . Once the Court declared the admissibility of all the requests for interpretation (both of the appellant State and the legal representatives – different to the common intervener – of a group of victims), it had to clarify all the matters presented to it, instead of formulating the warning – without cost -, in the cas d'espèce – of the mentioned paragraphs 25-26 of the present Judgment. 34 13