situation and enabled the Court to move forward with its case law on the scope of this right set forth in the American Convention, it would have avoided impacts to the effectiveness of the decision in the form of doubts arising as to the direct justiciability of Article 26 of the ACHR. 8. Also, addressing the matter in question through Article 23(1)(c) read in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the ACHR would have been enough to secure a broad range of protection in the specific case without setting a weak precedent. Although the State recognized its responsibility with respect to Article 26 of the Convention, the Court is not required to validate this stance; on the contrary, it is required to review it to ensure it complies with the law. The Court should have conducted this review by analyzing the case based on Article 23. Should it have done so, it would have reached a truly unanimous decision and strengthened the standard associated with respecting and guaranteeing the right to access to the public service under conditions of equality. Likewise, proceeding in this way would have provided the States and residents of the region with greater certainty in later cases, with respect to the consequences of using discriminatory criteria for preventing persons with disabilities from exercising the public service as regards international State responsibility and measures that must be implemented in domestic law to prevent it. B. New change to the modality for declaring violations in operative paragraphs 9. Problems highlighted in section A—regarding which I have gone into more depth in other opinions—have resulted in a multiplicity of modalities for declaring violations in the operative paragraphs. Since the case law on the direct justiciability of ESCER via Article 26 of the Convention has prevailed, the Court has moved on some occasions to group violations of rights protected under the Convention under a single operative paragraph,28 while in others it performs a differentiated analysis for each of the obligations and its effects in order to issue a declaration of State responsibility.29 First, I should say that due to a lack of grounds justifying the changes in one case or another, it would seem this practice is not based on criteria of reasonability. 10. Second, as I pointed out in my opinions in the cases of ANCEJUB-SUNAT v. Peru,30 Hernández v. Argentina,31 Casa Nina v. Peru,32 and Guachalá Chimbo v. Ecuador,33 this practice obscures the internal discrepancies on the scope of Article 26 of the Convention and impacts the effectiveness of the judgment. Indeed, this Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2019. Series C No. 394. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 28 Case of Hernández v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2019. Series C No. 395. 29 Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2019. Series C No. 394. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, para. 6. 30 Case of Hernández v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2019. Series C No. 395. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, para. 17. 31 Case of Casa Nina v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment dated November 24, 2020. Series C No. 419. Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto, para. 7. 32 Case of Guachalá Chimbo et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 26, 2021. Series C No. 423. Concurring and partially dissenting opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. 33 4